display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
3 ideas
| 16381 | The content of thought is what is required to understand it (which involves hearers) [Recanati] |
| Full Idea: As Evans emphasises, what matters when we want to individuate semantic content is what would count as a proper understanding of an utterance; but 'understanding' defines the task of the hearer. | |
| From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 16.2) | |
| A reaction: [cites Evans 1982: 92, 143n, 171] I like to place (following Aristotle) understanding at the centre of all of philosophy, so this seems to me an appealing idea. It makes misunderstandings interesting. |
| 21541 | The complexity of the content correlates with the complexity of the object [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Every property of the object seems to demand a strictly correlative property of the content, and the content, therefore, must have every complexity belonging to the object. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions [1904], p.55) | |
| A reaction: This claim gives a basis for his 'congruence' account of the correspondence theory of truth. It strikes me as false. If I talk of the 'red red robin', I don't mention the robin's feet. He ignores the psychological selection we make in abstraction. |
| 7531 | We don't assert private thoughts; the objects are part of what we assert [Russell] |
| Full Idea: I believe Mont Blanc itself is a component part of what is actually asserted in the proposition 'Mont Blanc is more than 4000 metres high'; we do not assert the thought, which is a private psychological matter, but the object of the thought. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Letters to Frege [1902], 1904.12.12), quoted by Ray Monk - Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude Ch.4 | |
| A reaction: This would appear to be pretty much externalism about concepts, given that Russell would accept that other people know much more about Mont Blanc than he does, and their knowledge is included in what he asserts. |