5160
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There is a mean of feelings, as in our responses to the good or bad fortune of others [Aristotle]
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Full Idea:
There are mean states also in the sphere of feelings. …The man who feels righteous indignation is distressed at instances of undeserved good fortune, but the envious man is distressed at any good fortune, and the spiteful man rejoices at bad fortune.
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From:
Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1108a29)
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A reaction:
This example captures nicely the crucial point that Aristotle wants our actions and responses to be appropriate, rather than just restrained. The disciple of Aristotle does not conduct himself like a cold Stoic, but has lively responses to situations.
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4326
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Aristotle gives a superior account of rationality, because he allows emotions to participate [Hursthouse on Aristotle]
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Full Idea:
Aristotle gives a superior account of human rationality, because he allows emotions to participate in reason, rather than being mere animal, non-rational impulses.
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From:
comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE]) by Rosalind Hursthouse - On Virtue Ethics Intro
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A reaction:
This is obviously helpful in virtue ethics, but it is a bit questionable, if the core of rationality is 'giving reasons'. A feeling might be a reason, but only once it has been conceptualised. "For RLS, his feelings were his reasons", said Henry James.
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23307
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Aristotle makes belief a part of reason, but sees desires as separate [Aristotle, by Sorabji]
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Full Idea:
Aristotle insists [against Plato] that desires, even rational desires, are a capacity distinct from reason, as is perception. Belief is included within reason. And he sometimes distinguishes steps of reasoning from insight.
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From:
report of Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 428-432) by Richard Sorabji - Rationality 'Shifting'
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A reaction:
So the standard picture of desire as permanently in conflict with reason comes from Aristotle. Maybe Plato is right on that one (though he doesn't say much about it). Since objectivity needs knowledge, reason does need belief.
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23311
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Aristotle sees reason as much more specific than our more everyday concept of it [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
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Full Idea:
It seems that Aristotle does not associate reason primarily with ordinary, everyday thought and reasoning, as we do, but with a much more specific function of reason.
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From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 980b) by Michael Frede - Aristotle's Rationalism p.163
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A reaction:
Although Aristotle is naturalistic, he is also a bit of a dualist, and so is less keen than I am to connect human reason with sensible behaviour in animals.
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23310
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Animals live by sensations, and some have good memories, but they don't connect experiences [Aristotle]
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Full Idea:
By nature animals are born with the faculty of sensation, and from sensation memory is produced in some of them, though not in others; therefore the former are more intelligent. …Animals live by appearances and memories, with little connected experience.
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From:
Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 980a28-)
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A reaction:
I assume that larger animals make judgements, which have to rely on previous experiences, so I think he underestimates the cleverest animals. We now know about Caledonian Crows, which amaze us, and would have amazed Aristotle.
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