Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Melvin Fitting, Aristotle and Isaiah

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11 ideas

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
4405 The attainment of truth is the task of the intellectual part of the soul [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The attainment of truth is the task of both the intellectual parts of the soul (calculation and deliberation).
     From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1139b10)
     A reaction: Obviously true, I would have thought, and equally true of the evolved brain, though there are plenty of people out there who try to deny it.
1733 Thinking is not perceiving, but takes the form of imagination and speculation [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Thinking, then, is something other than perceiving, and its two kinds are held to be imagination and supposition.
     From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 427b28)
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / d. Emotional feeling
22510 Some emotional states are too strong for human nature [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Many classify even love as involuntary, and certain cases of anger and certain natural states as being too strong for human nature; and we regard them as being pardonable, as being of such a nature as to be constrained by nature.
     From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1225b20)
     A reaction: Blind terror would presumably count as another such state. An interesting aspect of Aristotle's picture - that human nature contains ingredients that are not part of a natural harmonious whole.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
5160 There is a mean of feelings, as in our responses to the good or bad fortune of others [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: There are mean states also in the sphere of feelings. …The man who feels righteous indignation is distressed at instances of undeserved good fortune, but the envious man is distressed at any good fortune, and the spiteful man rejoices at bad fortune.
     From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1108a29)
     A reaction: This example captures nicely the crucial point that Aristotle wants our actions and responses to be appropriate, rather than just restrained. The disciple of Aristotle does not conduct himself like a cold Stoic, but has lively responses to situations.
23913 Nearly all the good and bad states of character are concerned with feelings [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Pretty much all of the praiseworthy or blameworthy states concerned with character are either excesses, deficiencies, or medial conditions in feelings.
     From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1233b16)
     A reaction: Suggests that the ideal state of character is the result of long and careful tuning of the feelings - insofar as we can control them. Presumably we can train feelings of hatred or compassion, by appropriate exposures. These states are NOT virtues.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
4326 Aristotle gives a superior account of rationality, because he allows emotions to participate [Hursthouse on Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Aristotle gives a superior account of human rationality, because he allows emotions to participate in reason, rather than being mere animal, non-rational impulses.
     From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE]) by Rosalind Hursthouse - On Virtue Ethics Intro
     A reaction: This is obviously helpful in virtue ethics, but it is a bit questionable, if the core of rationality is 'giving reasons'. A feeling might be a reason, but only once it has been conceptualised. "For RLS, his feelings were his reasons", said Henry James.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
72 Assume our reason is in two parts, one for permanent first principles, and one for variable things [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Assume the rational soul has two parts, one to contemplate things with invariable first principles, one to contemplate variable things.
     From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1139a06)
     A reaction: 'Assume' is interesting. He presumably isn't asserting this division as a fact. So his methodology is make assumptions - probably as aids to clear thinking.
23307 Aristotle makes belief a part of reason, but sees desires as separate [Aristotle, by Sorabji]
     Full Idea: Aristotle insists [against Plato] that desires, even rational desires, are a capacity distinct from reason, as is perception. Belief is included within reason. And he sometimes distinguishes steps of reasoning from insight.
     From: report of Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 428-432) by Richard Sorabji - Rationality 'Shifting'
     A reaction: So the standard picture of desire as permanently in conflict with reason comes from Aristotle. Maybe Plato is right on that one (though he doesn't say much about it). Since objectivity needs knowledge, reason does need belief.
23311 Aristotle sees reason as much more specific than our more everyday concept of it [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
     Full Idea: It seems that Aristotle does not associate reason primarily with ordinary, everyday thought and reasoning, as we do, but with a much more specific function of reason.
     From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 980b) by Michael Frede - Aristotle's Rationalism p.163
     A reaction: Although Aristotle is naturalistic, he is also a bit of a dualist, and so is less keen than I am to connect human reason with sensible behaviour in animals.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / c. Animal rationality
23300 Aristotle and the Stoics denied rationality to animals, while Platonists affirmed it [Aristotle, by Sorabji]
     Full Idea: Aristotle, and also the Stoics, denied rationality to animals. …The Platonists, the Pythagoreans, and some more independent Aristotelians, did grant reason and intellect to animals.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Richard Sorabji - Rationality 'Denial'
     A reaction: This is not the same as affirming or denying their consciousness. The debate depends on how rationality is conceived.
23310 Animals live by sensations, and some have good memories, but they don't connect experiences [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: By nature animals are born with the faculty of sensation, and from sensation memory is produced in some of them, though not in others; therefore the former are more intelligent. …Animals live by appearances and memories, with little connected experience.
     From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 980a28-)
     A reaction: I assume that larger animals make judgements, which have to rely on previous experiences, so I think he underestimates the cleverest animals. We now know about Caledonian Crows, which amaze us, and would have amazed Aristotle.