display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
3 ideas
23265 | The rational part of the soul is the desire for truth, understanding and recollection [Galen] |
Full Idea: That part of the soul which we call rational is desiderative: …it desires truth, knowledge, learning, understanding, and recollection - in short, all the good things. | |
From: Galen (The soul's dependence on the body [c.170], Kiv.2.772) | |
A reaction: Truth is no surprise, but recollection is. Note the separation of knowledge from understanding. This is a very good characterisation of rationality. For the Greeks it has a moral dimension, of wanting what is good. |
1884 | If we utter three steps of a logical argument, they never exist together [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: If we say "If day exists, lights exists", and then "day exists", and then "light exists", then parts of the judgement never exist together, and so the whole judgement will have no real existence. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.109) |
22763 | We can only dream of a winged man if we have experienced men and some winged thing [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: He who in his sleep dreams of a winged man does not dream so without having seen some winged thing and a man. And in general it is impossible to find in conception anything which one does not possess as known by experience. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Logicians (two books) [c.180], II.058) | |
A reaction: This precisely David Hume's empiricist account of the formation of concepts. Hume's example is a golden mountain, which he got from Aquinas. How do we dream of faces we have never encountered, or shapes we have never seen? |