display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
4 ideas
| 4269 | An emotion is a motive which is also a feeling [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: An emotion is a motive which is also a feeling. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.17) | |
| A reaction: What is a motive without feeling? A universalised judgment, perhaps. Which comes first, the motivation or the feeling? |
| 12174 | Only rational beings are attentive without motive or concern [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: It is only rational beings who can be attentive without a motive; only rational beings who can be interested in that in which they have no interest. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Laughter [1982], §12) | |
| A reaction: Rational beings make long term plans, so they cannot prejudge which things may turn out to be of interest to them. Scruton (a Kantian) makes it sound a little loftier than it actually is. |
| 4270 | Do we use reason to distinguish people from animals, or use that difference to define reason? [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: The difficulty of defining reason suggests that while pretending to use it to define the difference between humans and animals, they are actually using that difference to define reason. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.19) | |
| A reaction: Too pessimistic. We are perfectly capable of saying there is no significant difference between us and an alien. We have obvious abilities, which we can partly specify. |
| 5636 | Cartesian 'ideas' confuse concepts and propositions [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Cartesian 'ideas' seem to be both concepts and propositions at once. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Short History of Modern Philosophy [1981], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be the simple reason why modern philosophers don't like this seventeenth century notion. There is something slightly too tidy about the modern notion of propositions built out of concepts. Animals see propositions in a flash. |