Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Stephen Hetherington, John Locke and John Stuart Mill

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3 ideas

18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
A species of thing is an abstract idea, and a word is a sign that refers to the idea [Locke]
     Full Idea: That which general words signify is a sort of things; and does it by being a sign of an abstract idea in the mind; ..so that the essences (or species) of things are nothing else but these abstract ideas.
     From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694]), quoted by Stephen P. Schwartz - Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds §II
     A reaction: This has come in for a lot of criticism, culminating in Putnam saying that meanings 'ain't in the head' (Idea 4099). Wittgenstein's 'beetle in the box' problem is also partly aimed at it (Idea 4147). Locke misses the social aspect of language.
General conceptions are a necessary preliminary to Induction [Mill]
     Full Idea: Forming general conceptions is a necessary preliminary to Induction.
     From: John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843], 4.2.1)
     A reaction: A key link in the framework of empirical philosophies, which gets us from experience to science. Induction is the very process of generalisation. We can't bring a concept like 'evolution' to preliminary observations, so it must be formulated inductively.
The study of the nature of Abstract Ideas does not belong to logic, but to a different science [Mill]
     Full Idea: The metaphysical inquiry into the nature and composition of what have been called Abstract Ideas, or in other words, of the notions which answer in the mind to classes and to general names, belongs not to Logic, but to a different science.
     From: John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843], 4.2.1)
     A reaction: He doesn't name the science, but the point here seems to be precisely what Frege so vigorously disagreed with. I would say that the state of being 'abstract' has logical aspects, and can be partly described by logic, but that Mill is basically right.