display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
3 ideas
| 18020 | Propositional attitudes relate agents to either propositions, or meanings, or sentence/utterances [Magidor] |
| Full Idea: Three views of the semantics of propositional attitudes: they are relations between agents and propositions ('propositional' view); relations between individuals and meanings (Fregean); or relations of individuals and sentences/utterances ('sentential'). | |
| From: Ofra Magidor (Category Mistakes [2013], 3.4) | |
| A reaction: I am a propositionalist on this one. Meanings are too vague, and sentences are too linguistic. |
| 18035 | Two sentences with different meanings can, on occasion, have the same content [Magidor] |
| Full Idea: It is commonly assumed that meaning and content can come apart: the sentence 'I am writing' and 'Ofra is writing' may have different meanings, even if, as currently uttered, they express the same content. | |
| From: Ofra Magidor (Category Mistakes [2013], 4.1) | |
| A reaction: From that, I would judge 'content' to mean the same as 'proposition'. |
| 18018 | To grasp 'two' and 'green', must you know that two is not green? [Magidor] |
| Full Idea: Is it a necessary condition on possessing the concepts of 'two' and 'green' that one does not believe that two is green? I think this claim is false. | |
| From: Ofra Magidor (Category Mistakes [2013], 3.4) | |
| A reaction: To see that it is false one only has to consider much more sophisticated concepts, which are grasped without knowing their full implications. I might think two is green because I fully grasp 'two', but have not yet mastered 'green'. |