Combining Philosophers
Ideas for David Fair, E.J. Lowe and John Heil
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21 ideas
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
4625
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Is mental imagery pictorial, or is it propositional? [Heil]
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6648
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Some behaviourists believe thought is just suppressed speech [Lowe]
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18503
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You can think of tomatoes without grasping what they are [Heil]
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
4607
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Folk psychology and neuroscience are no more competitors than cartography and geology are [Heil]
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
6651
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People are wildly inaccurate in estimating probabilities about an observed event [Lowe]
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6652
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'Base rate neglect' makes people favour the evidence over its background [Lowe]
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 8. Human Thought
18538
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Non-conscious thought may be unlike conscious thought [Heil]
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18537
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Linguistic thought is just as imagistic as non-linguistic thought [Heil]
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18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
7715
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Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe]
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18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
6655
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The 'Frame Problem' is how to program the appropriate application of general knowledge [Lowe]
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6657
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Computers can't be rational, because they lack motivation and curiosity [Lowe]
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18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / c. Turing Test
6656
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The Turing test is too behaviourist, and too verbal in its methods [Lowe]
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18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
6636
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The naturalistic views of how content is created are the causal theory and the teleological theory [Lowe]
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18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
6633
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Twin Earth cases imply that even beliefs about kinds of stuff are indexical [Lowe]
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18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
7058
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Externalism is causal-historical, or social, or biological [Heil]
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18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
7057
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Intentionality is based in dispositions, which are intrinsic to agents, suggesting internalism [Heil]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
16535
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A concept is a way of thinking of things or kinds, whether or not they exist [Lowe]
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18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
8299
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Abstractions are non-spatial, or dependent, or derived from concepts [Lowe]
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18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 5. Abstracta by Negation
4237
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Concrete and abstract objects are distinct because the former have causal powers and relations [Lowe]
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4238
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The centre of mass of the solar system is a non-causal abstract object, despite having a location [Lowe]
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18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
8306
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You can think of a direction without a line, but a direction existing with no lines is inconceivable [Lowe]
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