Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Donald Davidson, Aristotle and Gabriel M.A. Segal
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41 ideas
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
4405
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The attainment of truth is the task of the intellectual part of the soul [Aristotle]
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6392
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Thought depends on speech [Davidson]
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1733
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Thinking is not perceiving, but takes the form of imagination and speculation [Aristotle]
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / d. Emotional feeling
22510
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Some emotional states are too strong for human nature [Aristotle]
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
5160
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There is a mean of feelings, as in our responses to the good or bad fortune of others [Aristotle]
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23913
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Nearly all the good and bad states of character are concerned with feelings [Aristotle]
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
3112
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Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions [Segal]
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
4326
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Aristotle gives a superior account of rationality, because he allows emotions to participate [Hursthouse on Aristotle]
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3967
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Absence of all rationality would be absence of thought [Davidson]
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
72
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Assume our reason is in two parts, one for permanent first principles, and one for variable things [Aristotle]
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23307
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Aristotle makes belief a part of reason, but sees desires as separate [Aristotle, by Sorabji]
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23311
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Aristotle sees reason as much more specific than our more everyday concept of it [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / c. Animal rationality
23300
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Aristotle and the Stoics denied rationality to animals, while Platonists affirmed it [Aristotle, by Sorabji]
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23310
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Animals live by sensations, and some have good memories, but they don't connect experiences [Aristotle]
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 8. Human Thought
6393
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A creature doesn't think unless it interprets another's speech [Davidson]
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18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 1. Psychology
6386
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In no important way can psychology be reduced to the physical sciences [Davidson]
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18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
11245
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Many memories make up a single experience [Aristotle]
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18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
3108
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If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ [Segal]
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3110
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Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible [Segal]
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3124
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Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds [Segal]
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18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
6175
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External identification doesn't mean external location, as with sunburn [Davidson, by Rowlands]
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3974
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Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant [Davidson]
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8872
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It is widely supposed that externalism cannot be reconciled with first-person authority [Davidson]
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8874
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It is hard to interpret a speaker's actions if we take a broad view of the content [Davidson]
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3111
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Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference [Segal]
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3109
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If content is external, so are beliefs and desires [Segal]
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3104
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Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them? [Segal]
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3116
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Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users [Segal]
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3117
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Concepts can survive a big change in extension [Segal]
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3103
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Maybe content involves relations to a language community [Segal]
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18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
3121
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If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts [Segal]
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18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
3118
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If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things [Segal]
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3119
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Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms [Segal]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / i. Conceptual priority
10954
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It is unclear whether acute angles are prior to right angles, or fingers to men [Aristotle]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / a. Concepts and language
11144
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Concepts are only possible in a language community [Davidson]
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18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
9789
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You can't abstract natural properties to make Forms - objects and attributes are defined together [Aristotle]
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9070
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We learn primitives and universals by induction from perceptions [Aristotle]
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18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
9788
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Mathematicians study what is conceptually separable, and doesn't lead to error [Aristotle]
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9792
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Mathematicians study quantity and continuity, and remove the perceptible features of things [Aristotle]
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9077
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Mathematicians suppose inseparable aspects to be separable, and study them in isolation [Aristotle]
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18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
9075
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If health happened to be white, the science of health would not study whiteness [Aristotle]
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