Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Donald Davidson, Aristotle and Gabriel M.A. Segal

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41 ideas

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
The attainment of truth is the task of the intellectual part of the soul [Aristotle]
Thought depends on speech [Davidson]
Thinking is not perceiving, but takes the form of imagination and speculation [Aristotle]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / d. Emotional feeling
Some emotional states are too strong for human nature [Aristotle]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
There is a mean of feelings, as in our responses to the good or bad fortune of others [Aristotle]
Nearly all the good and bad states of character are concerned with feelings [Aristotle]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions [Segal]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Aristotle gives a superior account of rationality, because he allows emotions to participate [Hursthouse on Aristotle]
Absence of all rationality would be absence of thought [Davidson]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
Assume our reason is in two parts, one for permanent first principles, and one for variable things [Aristotle]
Aristotle makes belief a part of reason, but sees desires as separate [Aristotle, by Sorabji]
Aristotle sees reason as much more specific than our more everyday concept of it [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / c. Animal rationality
Aristotle and the Stoics denied rationality to animals, while Platonists affirmed it [Aristotle, by Sorabji]
Animals live by sensations, and some have good memories, but they don't connect experiences [Aristotle]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 8. Human Thought
A creature doesn't think unless it interprets another's speech [Davidson]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 1. Psychology
In no important way can psychology be reduced to the physical sciences [Davidson]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
Many memories make up a single experience [Aristotle]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ [Segal]
Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible [Segal]
Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
External identification doesn't mean external location, as with sunburn [Davidson, by Rowlands]
Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant [Davidson]
It is widely supposed that externalism cannot be reconciled with first-person authority [Davidson]
It is hard to interpret a speaker's actions if we take a broad view of the content [Davidson]
Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference [Segal]
If content is external, so are beliefs and desires [Segal]
Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them? [Segal]
Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users [Segal]
Concepts can survive a big change in extension [Segal]
Maybe content involves relations to a language community [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things [Segal]
Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms [Segal]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / i. Conceptual priority
It is unclear whether acute angles are prior to right angles, or fingers to men [Aristotle]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / a. Concepts and language
Concepts are only possible in a language community [Davidson]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
You can't abstract natural properties to make Forms - objects and attributes are defined together [Aristotle]
We learn primitives and universals by induction from perceptions [Aristotle]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
Mathematicians study what is conceptually separable, and doesn't lead to error [Aristotle]
Mathematicians study quantity and continuity, and remove the perceptible features of things [Aristotle]
Mathematicians suppose inseparable aspects to be separable, and study them in isolation [Aristotle]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
If health happened to be white, the science of health would not study whiteness [Aristotle]