Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Donald Davidson, Stephen R. Grimm and Edouard Machery
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45 ideas
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
18561
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We can identify a set of cognitive capacities which are 'higher order' [Machery]
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6392
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Thought depends on speech [Davidson]
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
3967
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Absence of all rationality would be absence of thought [Davidson]
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 8. Human Thought
6393
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A creature doesn't think unless it interprets another's speech [Davidson]
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18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 1. Psychology
6386
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In no important way can psychology be reduced to the physical sciences [Davidson]
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18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
6175
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External identification doesn't mean external location, as with sunburn [Davidson, by Rowlands]
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3974
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Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant [Davidson]
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8872
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It is widely supposed that externalism cannot be reconciled with first-person authority [Davidson]
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8874
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It is hard to interpret a speaker's actions if we take a broad view of the content [Davidson]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
18574
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Concepts for categorisation and for induction may be quite different [Machery]
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18588
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Concept theories aim at their knowledge, processes, format, acquisition, and location [Machery]
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18611
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We should abandon 'concept', and just use 'prototype', 'exemplar' and 'theory' [Machery]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / b. Concepts in philosophy
18567
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In the philosophy of psychology, concepts are usually introduced as constituents of thoughts [Machery]
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18569
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In philosophy theories of concepts explain how our propositional attitudes have content [Machery]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / c. Concepts in psychology
18563
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By 'concept' psychologists mean various sorts of representation or structure [Machery]
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18557
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Psychologists treat concepts as long-term knowledge bodies which lead to judgements [Machery]
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18558
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Concept theorists examine their knowledge, format, processes, acquisition and location [Machery]
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18560
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Psychologist treat concepts as categories [Machery]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
18592
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The concepts OBJECT or AGENT may be innate [Machery]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
18566
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Concepts should contain working memory, not long-term, because they control behaviour [Machery]
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18584
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One hybrid theory combines a core definition with a prototype for identification [Machery]
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18585
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Heterogeneous concepts might have conflicting judgements, where hybrid theories will not [Machery]
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18578
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Concepts as definitions was rejected, and concepts as prototypes, exemplars or theories proposed [Machery]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
18575
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The concepts for a class typically include prototypes, and exemplars, and theories [Machery]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / c. Classical concepts
18583
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Many categories don't seem to have a definition [Machery]
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18590
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Classical theory implies variety in processing times, but this does not generally occur [Machery]
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18591
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Classical theory can't explain facts like typical examples being categorised quicker [Machery]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / d. Concepts as prototypes
18594
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Knowing typical properties of things is especially useful in induction [Machery]
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18593
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The term 'prototype' is used for both typical category members, and the representation [Machery]
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18595
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Prototype theories are based on computation of similarities with the prototype [Machery]
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18596
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Prototype theorists don't tell us how we select the appropriate prototype [Machery]
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18603
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Maybe concepts are not the typical properties, but the ideal properties [Machery]
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18606
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The prototype view predicts that typical members are easier to categorise [Machery]
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18605
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It is more efficient to remember the prototype, than repeatedly create it from exemplars [Machery]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / e. Concepts from exemplars
18597
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Concepts as exemplars are based on the knowledge of properties of each particular [Machery]
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18598
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Exemplar theories need to explain how the relevant properties are selected from a multitude of them [Machery]
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18599
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In practice, known examples take priority over the rest of the set of exemplars [Machery]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
18587
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The theory account is sometimes labelled as 'knowledge' or 'explanation' in approach [Machery]
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18600
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Theory Theory says category concepts are knowledge stores explaining membership [Machery]
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18601
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Theory Theory says concepts are explanatory knowledge, and concepts form domains [Machery]
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18607
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Theory theorists rely on best explanation, rather than on similarities [Machery]
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18608
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If categorisation is not by similarity, it seems to rely on what properties things might have [Machery]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / a. Concepts and language
11144
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Concepts are only possible in a language community [Davidson]
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18577
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The word 'grandmother' may be two concepts, with a prototype and a definition [Machery]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / b. Concepts are linguistic
18589
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For behaviourists concepts are dispositions to link category members to names [Machery]
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