Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Fran��ois Recanati, Peter Simons and Edouard Machery

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these philosophers

display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers

57 ideas

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
18561 We can identify a set of cognitive capacities which are 'higher order' [Machery]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
18409 Indexicals apply to singular thought, and mental files have essentially indexical features [Recanati]
22247 Indexicality is not just a feature of language; examples show it also occurs in thought [Recanati]
22248 How can we communicate indexical thoughts to people not in the right context? [Recanati]
16354 Indexicality is closely related to singularity, exploiting our direct relations with things [Recanati]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
16371 Files can be confused, if two files correctly have a single name, or one file has two names [Recanati]
16373 Encylopedic files have further epistemic links, beyond the basic one [Recanati]
16375 Singular thoughts need a mental file, and an acquaintance relation from file to object [Recanati]
16377 Expected acquaintance can create a thought-vehicle file, but without singular content [Recanati]
16378 An 'indexed' file marks a file which simulates the mental file of some other person [Recanati]
16387 Reference by mental files is Millian, in emphasising acquaintance, rather than satisfaction [Recanati]
16358 The reference of a file is fixed by what it relates to, not the information it contains [Recanati]
16361 A mental file treats all of its contents as concerning one object [Recanati]
16367 There are transient 'demonstrative' files, habitual 'recognitional' files, cumulative 'encyclopedic' files [Recanati]
16368 Files are hierarchical: proto-files, then first-order, then higher-order encyclopedic [Recanati]
16370 A file has a 'nucleus' through its relation to the object, and a 'periphery' of links to other files [Recanati]
22242 Mental files are concepts, which are either collections or (better) containers [Recanati]
22243 The Frege case of believing a thing is both F and not-F is explained by separate mental files [Recanati]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
16381 The content of thought is what is required to understand it (which involves hearers) [Recanati]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
16365 Mental files are individual concepts (thought constituents) [Recanati]
18574 Concepts for categorisation and for induction may be quite different [Machery]
18588 Concept theories aim at their knowledge, processes, format, acquisition, and location [Machery]
18611 We should abandon 'concept', and just use 'prototype', 'exemplar' and 'theory' [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / b. Concepts in philosophy
18567 In the philosophy of psychology, concepts are usually introduced as constituents of thoughts [Machery]
18569 In philosophy theories of concepts explain how our propositional attitudes have content [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / c. Concepts in psychology
18563 By 'concept' psychologists mean various sorts of representation or structure [Machery]
18558 Concept theorists examine their knowledge, format, processes, acquisition and location [Machery]
18557 Psychologists treat concepts as long-term knowledge bodies which lead to judgements [Machery]
18560 Psychologist treat concepts as categories [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
18592 The concepts OBJECT or AGENT may be innate [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
18566 Concepts should contain working memory, not long-term, because they control behaviour [Machery]
18584 One hybrid theory combines a core definition with a prototype for identification [Machery]
18585 Heterogeneous concepts might have conflicting judgements, where hybrid theories will not [Machery]
18578 Concepts as definitions was rejected, and concepts as prototypes, exemplars or theories proposed [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
18575 The concepts for a class typically include prototypes, and exemplars, and theories [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / c. Classical concepts
18591 Classical theory can't explain facts like typical examples being categorised quicker [Machery]
18583 Many categories don't seem to have a definition [Machery]
18590 Classical theory implies variety in processing times, but this does not generally occur [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / d. Concepts as prototypes
18594 Knowing typical properties of things is especially useful in induction [Machery]
18593 The term 'prototype' is used for both typical category members, and the representation [Machery]
18595 Prototype theories are based on computation of similarities with the prototype [Machery]
18596 Prototype theorists don't tell us how we select the appropriate prototype [Machery]
18603 Maybe concepts are not the typical properties, but the ideal properties [Machery]
18605 It is more efficient to remember the prototype, than repeatedly create it from exemplars [Machery]
18606 The prototype view predicts that typical members are easier to categorise [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / e. Concepts from exemplars
18597 Concepts as exemplars are based on the knowledge of properties of each particular [Machery]
18598 Exemplar theories need to explain how the relevant properties are selected from a multitude of them [Machery]
18599 In practice, known examples take priority over the rest of the set of exemplars [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
18600 Theory Theory says category concepts are knowledge stores explaining membership [Machery]
18601 Theory Theory says concepts are explanatory knowledge, and concepts form domains [Machery]
18607 Theory theorists rely on best explanation, rather than on similarities [Machery]
18608 If categorisation is not by similarity, it seems to rely on what properties things might have [Machery]
18587 The theory account is sometimes labelled as 'knowledge' or 'explanation' in approach [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / a. Concepts and language
18577 The word 'grandmother' may be two concepts, with a prototype and a definition [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / b. Concepts are linguistic
18589 For behaviourists concepts are dispositions to link category members to names [Machery]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
18883 Any equivalence relation among similar things allows the creation of an abstractum [Simons]
18884 Abstraction is usually seen as producing universals and numbers, but it can do more [Simons]