Combining Philosophers
Ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Jonathan Tallant and Hilary Putnam
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13 ideas
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
2074
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Can we give a scientific, computational account of folk psychology? [Putnam]
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
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Rationality is one part of our conception of human flourishing [Putnam]
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18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
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If everything uses mentalese, ALL concepts must be innate! [Putnam]
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2606
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No machine language can express generalisations [Putnam]
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18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
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If Twins talking about 'water' and 'XYZ' have different thoughts but identical heads, then thoughts aren't in the head [Putnam, by Crane]
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12026
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We say ice and steam are different forms of water, but not that they are different forms of H2O [Forbes,G on Putnam]
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3208
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Does 'water' mean a particular substance that was 'dubbed'? [Putnam, by Rey]
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14200
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'Water' on Twin Earth doesn't refer to water, but no mental difference can account for this [Putnam]
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2343
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Reference may be different while mental representation is the same [Putnam]
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18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
9168
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I can't distinguish elm trees, but I mean by 'elm' the same set of trees as everybody else [Putnam]
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5820
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'Water' has an unnoticed indexical component, referring to stuff around here [Putnam]
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7612
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Reference is social not individual, because we defer to experts when referring to elm trees [Putnam]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
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Concepts are (at least in part) abilities and not occurrences [Putnam]
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