Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Herodotus, Gabriel M.A. Segal and Georges Rey
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24 ideas
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
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3139
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Some attitudes are information (belief), others motivate (hatred) [Rey]
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
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3112
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Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions [Segal]
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18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 3. Modularity of Mind
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3174
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Good grammar can't come simply from stimuli [Rey]
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3171
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Children speak 90% good grammar [Rey]
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18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
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3213
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Animals may also use a language of thought [Rey]
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3170
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We train children in truth, not in grammar [Rey]
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18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
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3215
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Images can't replace computation, as they need it [Rey]
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3194
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CRTT is good on deduction, but not so hot on induction, abduction and practical reason [Rey]
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18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
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3147
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Problem-solving clearly involves manipulating images [Rey]
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3175
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Animals map things over time as well as over space [Rey]
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18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
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3110
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Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible [Segal]
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3124
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Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds [Segal]
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3108
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If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ [Segal]
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18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
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3116
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Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users [Segal]
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3117
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Concepts can survive a big change in extension [Segal]
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3207
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Simple externalism is that the meaning just is the object [Rey]
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3104
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Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them? [Segal]
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3103
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Maybe content involves relations to a language community [Segal]
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3111
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Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference [Segal]
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3109
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If content is external, so are beliefs and desires [Segal]
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18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
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3121
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If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts [Segal]
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18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
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3118
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If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things [Segal]
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3119
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Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms [Segal]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / h. Family resemblance
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3176
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Anything bears a family resemblance to a game, but obviously not anything counts as one [Rey]
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