Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Irenaeus, Franois Recanati and Christopher Peacocke
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34 ideas
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
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12608
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Concepts are distinguished by roles in judgement, and are thus tied to rationality [Peacocke]
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
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18409
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Indexicals apply to singular thought, and mental files have essentially indexical features [Recanati]
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22247
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Indexicality is not just a feature of language; examples show it also occurs in thought [Recanati]
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22248
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How can we communicate indexical thoughts to people not in the right context? [Recanati]
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16354
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Indexicality is closely related to singularity, exploiting our direct relations with things [Recanati]
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18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
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16371
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Files can be confused, if two files correctly have a single name, or one file has two names [Recanati]
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16373
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Encylopedic files have further epistemic links, beyond the basic one [Recanati]
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16375
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Singular thoughts need a mental file, and an acquaintance relation from file to object [Recanati]
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16377
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Expected acquaintance can create a thought-vehicle file, but without singular content [Recanati]
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16378
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An 'indexed' file marks a file which simulates the mental file of some other person [Recanati]
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16387
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Reference by mental files is Millian, in emphasising acquaintance, rather than satisfaction [Recanati]
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16358
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The reference of a file is fixed by what it relates to, not the information it contains [Recanati]
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16361
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A mental file treats all of its contents as concerning one object [Recanati]
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16367
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There are transient 'demonstrative' files, habitual 'recognitional' files, cumulative 'encyclopedic' files [Recanati]
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16368
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Files are hierarchical: proto-files, then first-order, then higher-order encyclopedic [Recanati]
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16370
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A file has a 'nucleus' through its relation to the object, and a 'periphery' of links to other files [Recanati]
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22242
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Mental files are concepts, which are either collections or (better) containers [Recanati]
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22243
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The Frege case of believing a thing is both F and not-F is explained by separate mental files [Recanati]
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18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
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16381
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The content of thought is what is required to understand it (which involves hearers) [Recanati]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
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16365
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Mental files are individual concepts (thought constituents) [Recanati]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / b. Concepts in philosophy
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18568
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Philosophy should merely give necessary and sufficient conditions for concept possession [Peacocke, by Machery]
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18571
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Peacocke's account of possession of a concept depends on one view of counterfactuals [Peacocke, by Machery]
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18572
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Peacocke's account separates psychology from philosophy, and is very sketchy [Machery on Peacocke]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
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17722
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The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things [Peacocke]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations
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11127
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If concepts just are mental representations, what of concepts we may never acquire? [Peacocke]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
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12577
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Possessing a concept is being able to make judgements which use it [Peacocke]
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12578
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A concept is just what it is to possess that concept [Peacocke]
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12587
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Employing a concept isn't decided by introspection, but by making judgements using it [Peacocke]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
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12605
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A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference [Peacocke]
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12607
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Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions [Peacocke]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
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12609
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Concepts have distinctive reasons and norms [Peacocke]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
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12584
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An analysis of concepts must link them to something unconceptualized [Peacocke]
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12604
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Any explanation of a concept must involve reference and truth [Peacocke]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
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9335
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Concepts are constituted by their role in a group of propositions to which we are committed [Peacocke, by Greco]
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