Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Jerry A. Fodor, Edouard Machery and Carrie Jenkins

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104 ideas

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
18561 We can identify a set of cognitive capacities which are 'higher order' [Machery]
12641 Connectionism gives no account of how constituents make complex concepts [Fodor]
2992 We may be able to explain rationality mechanically [Fodor]
2476 The goal of thought is to understand the world, not instantly sort it into conceptual categories [Fodor]
12640 Associative thinking avoids syntax, but can't preserve sense, reference or truth [Fodor]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
2440 Propositional attitudes are propositions presented in a certain way [Fodor]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
2988 Folk psychology is the only explanation of behaviour we have [Fodor]
3975 Folk psychology explains behaviour by reference to intentional states like belief and desire [Fodor]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
2450 Rationality has mental properties - autonomy, productivity, experiment [Fodor]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 3. Modularity of Mind
2499 Modules analyse stimuli, they don't tell you what to do [Fodor]
2509 Modules have in-built specialist information [Fodor]
22186 Mental modules are specialised, automatic, and isolated [Fodor, by Okasha]
2491 Modules have encapsulation, inaccessibility, private concepts, innateness [Fodor]
2497 Something must take an overview of the modules [Fodor]
2495 Obvious modules are language and commonsense explanation [Fodor]
2496 Blindness doesn't destroy spatial concepts [Fodor]
2507 Rationality rises above modules [Fodor]
2498 Modules make the world manageable [Fodor]
2500 Babies talk in consistent patterns [Fodor]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
2487 Mentalese may also incorporate some natural language [Fodor]
12643 Ambiguities in English are the classic reason for claiming that we don't think in English [Fodor]
2483 Mentalese doesn't require a theory of meaning [Fodor]
2480 Language is ambiguous, but thought isn't [Fodor]
8090 Since the language of thought is the same for all, it must be something like logical form [Fodor, by Devlin]
3010 Belief and desire are structured states, which need mentalese [Fodor]
2604 We must have expressive power BEFORE we learn language [Fodor]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
12647 Mental representations name things in the world, but also files in our memory [Fodor]
12649 We think in file names [Fodor]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
3135 Is thought a syntactic computation using representations? [Fodor, by Rey]
12655 Frame Problem: how to eliminate most beliefs as irrelevant, without searching them? [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
2983 Maybe narrow content is physical, broad content less so [Lyons on Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
12615 Mental representations are the old 'Ideas', but without images [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
2437 XYZ (Twin Earth 'water') is an impossibility [Fodor]
12630 If concept content is reference, then my Twin and I are referring to the same stuff [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
3982 How could the extrinsic properties of thoughts supervene on their intrinsic properties? [Fodor]
2441 Truth conditions require a broad concept of content [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
2999 Obsession with narrow content leads to various sorts of hopeless anti-realism [Fodor]
3114 Concepts aren't linked to stuff; they are what is caused by stuff [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 9. Conceptual Role Semantics
2486 Content can't be causal role, because causal role is decided by content [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
3012 Do identical thoughts have identical causal roles? [Fodor]
2452 Knowing the cause of a thought is almost knowing its content [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 12. Informational Semantics
2432 Is content basically information, fixed externally? [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
18574 Concepts for categorisation and for induction may be quite different [Machery]
18588 Concept theories aim at their knowledge, processes, format, acquisition, and location [Machery]
18611 We should abandon 'concept', and just use 'prototype', 'exemplar' and 'theory' [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / b. Concepts in philosophy
18567 In the philosophy of psychology, concepts are usually introduced as constituents of thoughts [Machery]
18569 In philosophy theories of concepts explain how our propositional attitudes have content [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / c. Concepts in psychology
18560 Psychologist treat concepts as categories [Machery]
18563 By 'concept' psychologists mean various sorts of representation or structure [Machery]
18558 Concept theorists examine their knowledge, format, processes, acquisition and location [Machery]
18557 Psychologists treat concepts as long-term knowledge bodies which lead to judgements [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
12658 Nobody knows how concepts are acquired [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
17718 Grounded concepts are trustworthy maps of the world [Jenkins]
17739 The physical effect of world on brain explains the concepts we possess [Jenkins]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
2492 Experience can't explain itself; the concepts needed must originate outside experience [Fodor]
11143 If concept-learning is hypothesis-testing, that needs innate concepts to get started [Fodor, by Margolis/Laurence]
6650 Fodor is now less keen on the innateness of concepts [Fodor, by Lowe]
12662 We have an innate capacity to form a concept, once we have grasped the stereotype [Fodor]
18592 The concepts OBJECT or AGENT may be innate [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations
12618 It is essential to the concept CAT that it be satisfied by cats [Fodor]
12635 Having a concept isn't a pragmatic matter, but being able to think about the concept [Fodor]
12652 Concepts have two sides; they are files that face thought, and also face subject-matter [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
2438 In the information view, concepts are potentials for making distinctions [Fodor]
12614 I prefer psychological atomism - that concepts are independent of epistemic capacities [Fodor]
2471 Are concepts best seen as capacities? [Fodor]
2472 For Pragmatists having a concept means being able to do something [Fodor]
12626 Cartesians put concept individuation before concept possession [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
12637 Frege's puzzles suggest to many that concepts have sense as well as reference [Fodor]
12638 If concepts have sense, we can't see the connection to their causal powers [Fodor]
12639 Belief in 'senses' may explain intentionality, but not mental processes [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
12654 You can't think 'brown dog' without thinking 'brown' and 'dog' [Fodor]
18566 Concepts should contain working memory, not long-term, because they control behaviour [Machery]
18584 One hybrid theory combines a core definition with a prototype for identification [Machery]
18585 Heterogeneous concepts might have conflicting judgements, where hybrid theories will not [Machery]
18578 Concepts as definitions was rejected, and concepts as prototypes, exemplars or theories proposed [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
12621 Definable concepts have constituents, which are necessary, individuate them, and demonstrate possession [Fodor]
18575 The concepts for a class typically include prototypes, and exemplars, and theories [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / c. Classical concepts
18583 Many categories don't seem to have a definition [Machery]
18591 Classical theory can't explain facts like typical examples being categorised quicker [Machery]
18590 Classical theory implies variety in processing times, but this does not generally occur [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / d. Concepts as prototypes
12622 Many concepts lack prototypes, and complex prototypes aren't built from simple ones [Fodor]
12659 Maybe stereotypes are a stage in concept acquisition (rather than a by-product) [Fodor]
12660 One stereotype might be a paradigm for two difference concepts [Fodor]
18594 Knowing typical properties of things is especially useful in induction [Machery]
18593 The term 'prototype' is used for both typical category members, and the representation [Machery]
18595 Prototype theories are based on computation of similarities with the prototype [Machery]
18596 Prototype theorists don't tell us how we select the appropriate prototype [Machery]
18603 Maybe concepts are not the typical properties, but the ideal properties [Machery]
18605 It is more efficient to remember the prototype, than repeatedly create it from exemplars [Machery]
18606 The prototype view predicts that typical members are easier to categorise [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / e. Concepts from exemplars
18597 Concepts as exemplars are based on the knowledge of properties of each particular [Machery]
18598 Exemplar theories need to explain how the relevant properties are selected from a multitude of them [Machery]
18599 In practice, known examples take priority over the rest of the set of exemplars [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
18587 The theory account is sometimes labelled as 'knowledge' or 'explanation' in approach [Machery]
18600 Theory Theory says category concepts are knowledge stores explaining membership [Machery]
18601 Theory Theory says concepts are explanatory knowledge, and concepts form domains [Machery]
18607 Theory theorists rely on best explanation, rather than on similarities [Machery]
18608 If categorisation is not by similarity, it seems to rely on what properties things might have [Machery]
12623 The theory theory can't actually tell us what concepts are [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / g. Conceptual atomism
12629 For the referential view of thought, the content of a concept is just its reference [Fodor]
12631 Compositionality requires that concepts be atomic [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / a. Concepts and language
18577 The word 'grandmother' may be two concepts, with a prototype and a definition [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / b. Concepts are linguistic
18589 For behaviourists concepts are dispositions to link category members to names [Machery]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
12657 Abstractionism claims that instances provide criteria for what is shared [Fodor]