Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Jerry A. Fodor, Immanuel Kant and Giordano Bruno
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31 ideas
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
17616
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Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind [Kant]
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5553
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Either experience creates concepts, or concepts make experience possible [Kant]
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5593
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Reason generates no concepts, but frees them from their link to experience in the understanding [Kant]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / c. Concepts in psychology
22004
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Concepts are rules for combining representations [Kant, by Pinkard]
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5543
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All human cognition is through concepts [Kant]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
12658
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Nobody knows how concepts are acquired [Fodor]
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16912
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Some concepts can be made a priori, which are general thoughts of objects, like quantity or cause [Kant]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
2492
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Experience can't explain itself; the concepts needed must originate outside experience [Fodor]
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11143
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If concept-learning is hypothesis-testing, that needs innate concepts to get started [Fodor, by Margolis/Laurence]
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6650
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Fodor is now less keen on the innateness of concepts [Fodor, by Lowe]
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12662
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We have an innate capacity to form a concept, once we have grasped the stereotype [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations
12618
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It is essential to the concept CAT that it be satisfied by cats [Fodor]
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12635
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Having a concept isn't a pragmatic matter, but being able to think about the concept [Fodor]
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12652
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Concepts have two sides; they are files that face thought, and also face subject-matter [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
2438
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In the information view, concepts are potentials for making distinctions [Fodor]
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12614
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I prefer psychological atomism - that concepts are independent of epistemic capacities [Fodor]
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2471
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Are concepts best seen as capacities? [Fodor]
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2472
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For Pragmatists having a concept means being able to do something [Fodor]
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12626
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Cartesians put concept individuation before concept possession [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
12637
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Frege's puzzles suggest to many that concepts have sense as well as reference [Fodor]
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12638
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If concepts have sense, we can't see the connection to their causal powers [Fodor]
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12639
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Belief in 'senses' may explain intentionality, but not mental processes [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
12654
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You can't think 'brown dog' without thinking 'brown' and 'dog' [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
8735
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Kant implies that concepts have analysable parts [Kant, by Shapiro]
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12621
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Definable concepts have constituents, which are necessary, individuate them, and demonstrate possession [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / d. Concepts as prototypes
12622
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Many concepts lack prototypes, and complex prototypes aren't built from simple ones [Fodor]
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12659
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Maybe stereotypes are a stage in concept acquisition (rather than a by-product) [Fodor]
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12660
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One stereotype might be a paradigm for two difference concepts [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
12623
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The theory theory can't actually tell us what concepts are [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / g. Conceptual atomism
12629
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For the referential view of thought, the content of a concept is just its reference [Fodor]
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12631
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Compositionality requires that concepts be atomic [Fodor]
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