Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Jerry A. Fodor, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Allan Gibbard
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29 ideas
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
12658
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Nobody knows how concepts are acquired [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
2492
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Experience can't explain itself; the concepts needed must originate outside experience [Fodor]
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11143
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If concept-learning is hypothesis-testing, that needs innate concepts to get started [Fodor, by Margolis/Laurence]
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6650
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Fodor is now less keen on the innateness of concepts [Fodor, by Lowe]
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12662
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We have an innate capacity to form a concept, once we have grasped the stereotype [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations
12618
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It is essential to the concept CAT that it be satisfied by cats [Fodor]
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12635
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Having a concept isn't a pragmatic matter, but being able to think about the concept [Fodor]
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12652
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Concepts have two sides; they are files that face thought, and also face subject-matter [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
12626
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Cartesians put concept individuation before concept possession [Fodor]
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12576
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Possessing a concept is knowing how to go on [Wittgenstein, by Peacocke]
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4157
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Concepts direct our interests and investigations, and express those interests [Wittgenstein]
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12606
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Man learns the concept of the past by remembering [Wittgenstein]
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2438
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In the information view, concepts are potentials for making distinctions [Fodor]
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12614
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I prefer psychological atomism - that concepts are independent of epistemic capacities [Fodor]
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2471
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Are concepts best seen as capacities? [Fodor]
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2472
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For Pragmatists having a concept means being able to do something [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
12639
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Belief in 'senses' may explain intentionality, but not mental processes [Fodor]
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12637
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Frege's puzzles suggest to many that concepts have sense as well as reference [Fodor]
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12638
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If concepts have sense, we can't see the connection to their causal powers [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
12654
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You can't think 'brown dog' without thinking 'brown' and 'dog' [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
12621
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Definable concepts have constituents, which are necessary, individuate them, and demonstrate possession [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / d. Concepts as prototypes
12622
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Many concepts lack prototypes, and complex prototypes aren't built from simple ones [Fodor]
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12659
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Maybe stereotypes are a stage in concept acquisition (rather than a by-product) [Fodor]
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12660
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One stereotype might be a paradigm for two difference concepts [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
12623
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The theory theory can't actually tell us what concepts are [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / g. Conceptual atomism
12629
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For the referential view of thought, the content of a concept is just its reference [Fodor]
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12631
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Compositionality requires that concepts be atomic [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / h. Family resemblance
4141
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Various games have a 'family resemblance', as their similarities overlap and criss-cross [Wittgenstein]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / a. Concepts and language
7084
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What can be said is what can be thought, so language shows the limits of thought [Wittgenstein, by Grayling]
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