Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Bertrand Russell and Franois Recanati
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34 ideas
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
5369
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It is rational to believe in reality, despite the lack of demonstrative reasons for it [Russell]
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
5375
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Knowledge of truths applies to judgements; knowledge by acquaintance applies to sensations and things [Russell]
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21711
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Russell's 'multiple relations' theory says beliefs attach to ingredients, not to propositions [Russell, by Linsky,B]
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5427
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Truth is when a mental state corresponds to a complex unity of external constituents [Russell]
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error
6443
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Surprise is a criterion of error [Russell]
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21542
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Do incorrect judgements have non-existent, or mental, or external objects? [Russell]
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22306
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To explain false belief we should take belief as relating to a proposition's parts, not to the whole thing [Russell]
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5425
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In order to explain falsehood, a belief must involve several terms, not two [Russell]
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6097
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The theory of error seems to need the existence of the non-existent [Russell]
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
18409
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Indexicals apply to singular thought, and mental files have essentially indexical features [Recanati]
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22247
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Indexicality is not just a feature of language; examples show it also occurs in thought [Recanati]
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22248
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How can we communicate indexical thoughts to people not in the right context? [Recanati]
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16354
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Indexicality is closely related to singularity, exploiting our direct relations with things [Recanati]
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18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
16371
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Files can be confused, if two files correctly have a single name, or one file has two names [Recanati]
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16373
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Encylopedic files have further epistemic links, beyond the basic one [Recanati]
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16375
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Singular thoughts need a mental file, and an acquaintance relation from file to object [Recanati]
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16377
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Expected acquaintance can create a thought-vehicle file, but without singular content [Recanati]
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16378
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An 'indexed' file marks a file which simulates the mental file of some other person [Recanati]
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16387
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Reference by mental files is Millian, in emphasising acquaintance, rather than satisfaction [Recanati]
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16358
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The reference of a file is fixed by what it relates to, not the information it contains [Recanati]
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16361
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A mental file treats all of its contents as concerning one object [Recanati]
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16367
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There are transient 'demonstrative' files, habitual 'recognitional' files, cumulative 'encyclopedic' files [Recanati]
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16368
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Files are hierarchical: proto-files, then first-order, then higher-order encyclopedic [Recanati]
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16370
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A file has a 'nucleus' through its relation to the object, and a 'periphery' of links to other files [Recanati]
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22242
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Mental files are concepts, which are either collections or (better) containers [Recanati]
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22243
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The Frege case of believing a thing is both F and not-F is explained by separate mental files [Recanati]
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18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
21541
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The complexity of the content correlates with the complexity of the object [Russell]
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16381
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The content of thought is what is required to understand it (which involves hearers) [Recanati]
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18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
7531
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We don't assert private thoughts; the objects are part of what we assert [Russell]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
16365
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Mental files are individual concepts (thought constituents) [Recanati]
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5384
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A universal of which we are aware is called a 'concept' [Russell]
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18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
10583
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Abstraction principles identify a common property, which is some third term with the right relation [Russell]
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10582
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The principle of Abstraction says a symmetrical, transitive relation analyses into an identity [Russell]
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10584
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A certain type of property occurs if and only if there is an equivalence relation [Russell]
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