Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Oswald Spengler, Jerry A. Fodor and Lord Kelvin (Wm Thomson)
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66 ideas
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
2992
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We may be able to explain rationality mechanically [Fodor]
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12641
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Connectionism gives no account of how constituents make complex concepts [Fodor]
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2476
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The goal of thought is to understand the world, not instantly sort it into conceptual categories [Fodor]
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12640
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Associative thinking avoids syntax, but can't preserve sense, reference or truth [Fodor]
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
2440
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Propositional attitudes are propositions presented in a certain way [Fodor]
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
2988
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Folk psychology is the only explanation of behaviour we have [Fodor]
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3975
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Folk psychology explains behaviour by reference to intentional states like belief and desire [Fodor]
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
2450
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Rationality has mental properties - autonomy, productivity, experiment [Fodor]
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18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 3. Modularity of Mind
2499
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Modules analyse stimuli, they don't tell you what to do [Fodor]
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2496
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Blindness doesn't destroy spatial concepts [Fodor]
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2498
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Modules make the world manageable [Fodor]
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2500
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Babies talk in consistent patterns [Fodor]
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2507
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Rationality rises above modules [Fodor]
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2497
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Something must take an overview of the modules [Fodor]
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2509
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Modules have in-built specialist information [Fodor]
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22186
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Mental modules are specialised, automatic, and isolated [Fodor, by Okasha]
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2491
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Modules have encapsulation, inaccessibility, private concepts, innateness [Fodor]
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2495
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Obvious modules are language and commonsense explanation [Fodor]
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18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
2483
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Mentalese doesn't require a theory of meaning [Fodor]
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12643
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Ambiguities in English are the classic reason for claiming that we don't think in English [Fodor]
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8090
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Since the language of thought is the same for all, it must be something like logical form [Fodor, by Devlin]
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2604
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We must have expressive power BEFORE we learn language [Fodor]
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2480
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Language is ambiguous, but thought isn't [Fodor]
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2487
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Mentalese may also incorporate some natural language [Fodor]
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3010
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Belief and desire are structured states, which need mentalese [Fodor]
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18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
12649
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We think in file names [Fodor]
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12647
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Mental representations name things in the world, but also files in our memory [Fodor]
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18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
3135
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Is thought a syntactic computation using representations? [Fodor, by Rey]
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12655
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Frame Problem: how to eliminate most beliefs as irrelevant, without searching them? [Fodor]
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18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
2983
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Maybe narrow content is physical, broad content less so [Lyons on Fodor]
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18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
12615
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Mental representations are the old 'Ideas', but without images [Fodor]
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18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
2437
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XYZ (Twin Earth 'water') is an impossibility [Fodor]
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12630
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If concept content is reference, then my Twin and I are referring to the same stuff [Fodor]
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18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
2441
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Truth conditions require a broad concept of content [Fodor]
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3982
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How could the extrinsic properties of thoughts supervene on their intrinsic properties? [Fodor]
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18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
3114
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Concepts aren't linked to stuff; they are what is caused by stuff [Fodor]
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2999
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Obsession with narrow content leads to various sorts of hopeless anti-realism [Fodor]
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18. Thought / C. Content / 9. Conceptual Role Semantics
2486
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Content can't be causal role, because causal role is decided by content [Fodor]
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18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
3012
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Do identical thoughts have identical causal roles? [Fodor]
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2452
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Knowing the cause of a thought is almost knowing its content [Fodor]
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18. Thought / C. Content / 12. Informational Semantics
2432
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Is content basically information, fixed externally? [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
12658
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Nobody knows how concepts are acquired [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
2492
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Experience can't explain itself; the concepts needed must originate outside experience [Fodor]
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11143
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If concept-learning is hypothesis-testing, that needs innate concepts to get started [Fodor, by Margolis/Laurence]
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6650
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Fodor is now less keen on the innateness of concepts [Fodor, by Lowe]
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12662
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We have an innate capacity to form a concept, once we have grasped the stereotype [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations
12618
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It is essential to the concept CAT that it be satisfied by cats [Fodor]
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12635
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Having a concept isn't a pragmatic matter, but being able to think about the concept [Fodor]
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12652
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Concepts have two sides; they are files that face thought, and also face subject-matter [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
12626
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Cartesians put concept individuation before concept possession [Fodor]
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2438
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In the information view, concepts are potentials for making distinctions [Fodor]
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12614
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I prefer psychological atomism - that concepts are independent of epistemic capacities [Fodor]
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2471
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Are concepts best seen as capacities? [Fodor]
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2472
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For Pragmatists having a concept means being able to do something [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
12637
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Frege's puzzles suggest to many that concepts have sense as well as reference [Fodor]
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12638
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If concepts have sense, we can't see the connection to their causal powers [Fodor]
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12639
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Belief in 'senses' may explain intentionality, but not mental processes [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
12654
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You can't think 'brown dog' without thinking 'brown' and 'dog' [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
12621
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Definable concepts have constituents, which are necessary, individuate them, and demonstrate possession [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / d. Concepts as prototypes
12622
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Many concepts lack prototypes, and complex prototypes aren't built from simple ones [Fodor]
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12659
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Maybe stereotypes are a stage in concept acquisition (rather than a by-product) [Fodor]
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12660
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One stereotype might be a paradigm for two difference concepts [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
12623
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The theory theory can't actually tell us what concepts are [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / g. Conceptual atomism
12629
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For the referential view of thought, the content of a concept is just its reference [Fodor]
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12631
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Compositionality requires that concepts be atomic [Fodor]
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18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
12657
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Abstractionism claims that instances provide criteria for what is shared [Fodor]
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