Combining Philosophers
Ideas for William James, Arnauld / Nicole and Christopher Peacocke
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19 ideas
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
23981
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Rage is inconceivable without bodily responses; so there are no disembodied emotions [James]
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
22650
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How can the ground of rationality be itself rational? [James]
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
22643
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It seems that we feel rational when we detect no irrationality [James]
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
12608
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Concepts are distinguished by roles in judgement, and are thus tied to rationality [Peacocke]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / b. Concepts in philosophy
18568
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Philosophy should merely give necessary and sufficient conditions for concept possession [Peacocke, by Machery]
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18571
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Peacocke's account of possession of a concept depends on one view of counterfactuals [Peacocke, by Machery]
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18572
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Peacocke's account separates psychology from philosophy, and is very sketchy [Machery on Peacocke]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
17722
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The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things [Peacocke]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations
11127
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If concepts just are mental representations, what of concepts we may never acquire? [Peacocke]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
18975
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We return to experience with concepts, where they show us differences [James]
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12577
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Possessing a concept is being able to make judgements which use it [Peacocke]
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12578
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A concept is just what it is to possess that concept [Peacocke]
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12587
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Employing a concept isn't decided by introspection, but by making judgements using it [Peacocke]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
12605
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A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference [Peacocke]
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12607
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Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions [Peacocke]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
12609
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Concepts have distinctive reasons and norms [Peacocke]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
12584
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An analysis of concepts must link them to something unconceptualized [Peacocke]
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12604
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Any explanation of a concept must involve reference and truth [Peacocke]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
9335
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Concepts are constituted by their role in a group of propositions to which we are committed [Peacocke, by Greco]
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