Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Albert Camus, Anon (Ecc) and Stephen Yablo

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2 ideas

19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
The content of an assertion can be quite different from compositional content [Yablo]
     Full Idea: Assertive content - what a sentence is heard as saying - can be at quite a distance from compositional content.
     From: Stephen Yablo (Aboutness [2014], Intro)
     A reaction: This is the obvious reason why semantics cannot be entirely compositional, since there is nearly always a contextual component which then has to be added. In the case of irony, the compositional content is entirely reversed.
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
Truth-conditions as subject-matter has problems of relevance, short cut, and reversal [Yablo]
     Full Idea: If the subject-matter of S is how it is true, we get three unfortunate results: S has truth-value in worlds where its subject-matter draws a blank; learning what S is about tells you its truth-value; negating S changes what it's about.
     From: Stephen Yablo (Aboutness [2014], 02.8)
     A reaction: Together these make fairly devastating objections to the truth-conditions (in possible worlds) theory of meaning. The first-objection concerns when S is false