Combining Philosophers

Ideas for David J.Chalmers, Richard P. Feynman and George Berkeley

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2 ideas

19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Two-dimensional semantics gives a 'primary' and 'secondary' proposition for each statement [Chalmers]
     Full Idea: If we see a proposition as a function from possible worlds to truth-values, then the two sets of truth-conditions yield two propositions associated with any statement. A 'primary' for those which express a truth, and 'secondary' for counterfactual truth.
     From: David J.Chalmers (The Conscious Mind [1996], 1.2.4)
     A reaction: This is where 2-D semantics becomes increasingly 'Byzantine'. Intuition and introspection don't seem to offer me two different propositions for every sentence I utter. I can't see this theory catching on, even if it is technically beautiful.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
I can't really go wrong if I stick to wordless thought [Berkeley]
     Full Idea: So long as I confine my thoughts to my own ideas divested of words, I do not see how I can easily be mistaken.
     From: George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], Intro §22)
     A reaction: I think it was one of the great errors of twentieth century philosophy to say that Berkeley cannot do this, because thought needs language. Personally I think language lags along behind most our thinking, tidying up the mess. I believe in propositions.