display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
2 ideas
13363 | A (modern) predicate is the result of leaving a gap for the name in a sentence [Bostock] |
Full Idea: A simple way of approaching the modern notion of a predicate is this: given any sentence which contains a name, the result of dropping that name and leaving a gap in its place is a predicate. Very different from predicates in Aristotle and Kant. | |
From: David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 3.2) | |
A reaction: This concept derives from Frege. To get to grips with contemporary philosophy you have to relearn all sorts of basic words like 'predicate' and 'object'. |
18121 | In logic a proposition means the same when it is and when it is not asserted [Bostock] |
Full Idea: In Modus Ponens where the first premise is 'P' and the second 'P→Q', in the first premise P is asserted but in the second it is not. Yet it must mean the same in both premises, or it would be guilty of the fallacy of equivocation. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 7.2) | |
A reaction: This is Geach's thought (leading to an objection to expressivism in ethics, that P means the same even if it is not expressed). |