Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Donald Davidson, Aristotle and Nicholas Bourbaki

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3 ideas

19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about humanity, so it's a different proposition from 'Socrates is human' [Davidson]
     Full Idea: The sentence 'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about the concept of humanity, unlike the "equivalent" 'Socrates is human', so they express different propositions.
     From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 5)
     A reaction: [compressed] I like this a lot, because it shows why we should focus on propositions rather than on sentences, or even utterances. And asking what the sentence is 'about' focuses us on the underlying proposition or thought.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
Spoken sounds vary between people, but are signs of affections of soul, which are the same for all [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Spoken sounds are symbols of affections in the soul, ...and just as written marks are not the same for all men, neither are spoken sounds. But what these are in the first place signs of - affections of the soul - are the same for all.
     From: Aristotle (On Interpretation [c.330 BCE], 16a03-08)
     A reaction: Loux identifies this passage as the source of the 'conceptualist' view of propositions, which I immediately identify with. The view that these propositions are 'the same for all' is plausible for normal objects, but dubious for complex abstractions.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them [Davidson]
     Full Idea: The idea of a proposition is unhelpful, until it is explained how exactly the words in the contained sentence manage to name or describe a proposition (which even Frege failed to achieve).
     From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.232)
     A reaction: It seems obvious to me that there are brain events best labelled as propositions, even if their fit with language is puzzling.