display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
8 ideas
2565 | Nature has no preferred way of being represented [Rorty] |
Full Idea: Nature has no preferred way of being represented. | |
From: Richard Rorty (Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature [1980], 6.5) | |
A reaction: Tree rings accidentally represent the passing of the years. If God went back and started again would she or he opt for a 'preferred way'? |
13882 | A milder claim is that understanding requires some evidence of that understanding [Wright,C] |
Full Idea: A mild version of the verification principle would say that it makes sense to think of someone as understanding an expression only if he is able, by his use of the expression, to give the best possible evidence that he understands it. | |
From: Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983], 1.vii) | |
A reaction: That doesn't seem to tell us what understanding actually consists of, and may just be the truism that to demonstrate anything whatsoever will necessarily involve some evidence. |
2560 | Can meanings remain the same when beliefs change? [Rorty] |
Full Idea: For cooler heads there must be some middle view between "meanings remain and beliefs change" and "meanings change whenever beliefs do". | |
From: Richard Rorty (Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature [1980], 6.2) | |
A reaction: The second one seems blatanty false. How could we otherwise explain a change in belief? But obviously some changes in belief (e.g. about electrons) produce a change in meaning. |
7320 | Holism cannot give a coherent account of scientific methodology [Wright,C, by Miller,A] |
Full Idea: Crispin Wright has argued that Quine's holism is implausible because it is actually incoherent: he claims that Quine's holism cannot provide us with a coherent account of scientific methodology. | |
From: report of Crispin Wright (Inventing Logical Necessity [1986]) by Alexander Miller - Philosophy of Language 4.5 | |
A reaction: This sounds promising, given my intuitive aversion to linguistic holism, and almost everything to do with Quine. Scientific methodology is not isolated, but spreads into our ordinary (experimental) interactions with the world (e.g. Idea 2461). |
2562 | A theory of reference seems needed to pick out objects without ghostly inner states [Rorty] |
Full Idea: The need to pick out objects without the help of definitions, essences, and meanings of terms produced, philosophers thought, a need for a "theory of reference". | |
From: Richard Rorty (Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature [1980], 6.3) | |
A reaction: Frege's was very perceptive in noting that meaning and reference are not the same. Whether we need a 'theory' of reference is unclear. It is worth describing how it occurs. |
13885 | If apparent reference can mislead, then so can apparent lack of reference [Wright,C] |
Full Idea: If the appearance of reference can be misleading, why cannot an apparent lack of reference be misleading? | |
From: Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983], 2.xi) | |
A reaction: A nice simple thought. Analytic philosophy has concerned itself a lot with sentences that seem to refer, but the reference can be analysed away. For me, this takes the question of reference out of the linguistic sphere, which wasn't Wright's plan. |
17857 | We can accept Frege's idea of object without assuming that predicates have a reference [Wright,C] |
Full Idea: The heart of the problem is Frege's assumption that predicates have Bedeutungen at all; and no reason is at present evident why someone who espouses Frege's notion of object is contrained to make that assumption. | |
From: Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983], 1.iv) | |
A reaction: This seems like a penetrating objection to Frege's view of reference, and presumably supports the Kripke approach. |
2559 | Davidson's theory of meaning focuses not on terms, but on relations between sentences [Rorty] |
Full Idea: A theory of meaning, for Davidson, is not an assemblage of "analyses" of the meanings of individual terms, but rather an understanding of the inferential relations between sentences. | |
From: Richard Rorty (Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature [1980], 6.1) | |
A reaction: Put that way, the influence of Frege on Davidson is obvious. Purely algebraic expressions can have inferential relations, using variables and formal 'sentences'. |