display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
4 ideas
| 16442 | I take propositions to be truth conditions [Stalnaker] |
| Full Idea: I will defend the view that propositions are truth conditions. | |
| From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Mere Possibilities [2012], 1.2) | |
| A reaction: This sounds close to the Russellian view, which I take to equate propositions (roughly) with facts or states of affairs. But are 'truth conditions' in the world or in the head? |
| 16447 | A theory of propositions at least needs primitive properties of consistency and of truth [Stalnaker] |
| Full Idea: A minimal theory of propositions can make do with just two primitive properties: a property of consistency applied to sets of propositions, and a property of truth applied to propositions. | |
| From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Mere Possibilities [2012], 2) | |
| A reaction: I would have thought a minimal theory would need some account of what a proposition is supposed to be (since there seems to be very little agreement about that). Stalnaker goes on to sketch a theory. |
| 14616 | A 'Russellian proposition' is an ordered sequence of individual, properties and relations [Stalnaker] |
| Full Idea: A 'Russellian proposition' is an ordered sequence containing the individual, along with properties and relations. | |
| From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Merely Possible Propositions [2010], p.22) | |
| A reaction: Since Russell took properties and relations to be features of reality, this made the whole proposition a feature of reality. This is utterly different from what I understand by the word 'proposition', which is a feature of thought, not of the world. |
| 16446 | Propositions presumably don't exist if the things they refer to don't exist [Stalnaker] |
| Full Idea: It seems plausible that singular propositions are object-dependent in the sense that the proposition would not exist if the individual did not. It is also plausible that some objects exist contingently, and there are singular propositions about them. | |
| From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Mere Possibilities [2012], 2) | |
| A reaction: This replies to the view that possible worlds are maximal sets of propositions, and so must exist for the worlds to exist; e.g. Lowe 1999:248. That is yet another commonplace of contemporary philosophy which I find utterly bewildering. |