Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Hans Reichenbach, Alvin Plantinga and Paul Boghossian

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3 ideas

19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Are propositions and states of affairs two separate things, or only one? I incline to say one [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: Are there two sorts of thing, propositions and states of affairs, or only one? I am inclined to the former view on the ground that propositions have a property, truth or falsehood, not had by states of affairs.
     From: Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976], 1)
     A reaction: Might a proposition be nothing more than an assertion that a state of affairs obtains? It would then pass his test. The idea that a proposition is a complex of facts in the external world ('Russellian' propositions?) quite baffles me.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
If propositions are concrete they don't have to exist, and so they can't be necessary truths [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: Someone who believes propositions are concrete cannot agree that some propositions are necessary. For propositions are contingent beings, and could have failed to exist. But if they fail to exist, then they fail to be true.
     From: Alvin Plantinga (Why Propositions cannot be concrete [1993], p.230)
     A reaction: [compressed] He implies the actual existence of an infinity of trivial, boring or ridiculous necessary truths. I suspect that he is just confusing a thought with its content. Or we might just treat necessary propositions as hypothetical.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
Propositions can't just be in brains, because 'there are no human beings' might be true [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: If propositions are brain inscriptions, then if there had been no human beings there would have been no propositions. But then 'there are no human beings' would have been true, so there would have been at least one truth (and thus one proposition).
     From: Alvin Plantinga (Why Propositions cannot be concrete [1993], p.229)
     A reaction: This would make 'there are no x's' true for any value of x apart from actual objects, which implies an infinity of propositions. Does Plantinga really believe that these all exist? He may be confusing propositions with facts.