display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
2 ideas
18418 | A theory of perspectival de se content gives truth conditions relative to an agent [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever] |
Full Idea: Lewis's theory of a perspectival 'de se' content ...delivers truth conditions not absolutely, but only relative to a choice of agent/center. | |
From: report of David Lewis (Attitudes De Dicto and De Se [1979]) by Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh - The Inessential Indexical 05.7 | |
A reaction: The proposal rests on a theory of 'centred' possible worlds, specifying the viewpoint of some agent within the whole system. It relies on accepting the idea that indexicals are special, which Cappelen and Dever reject. |
16278 | A particular functional role is what gives content to a thought [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Anything that is a thinker at all has a thought with a certain content in virtue of being in a state which occupies a certain functional role. | |
From: David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 2.3) | |
A reaction: So often Lewis seems to get things the wrong way round. Maybe if you invert his entire (fabulously consistent) philosophy, you get the right answer? I take the content to be what makes the role possible. |