Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Hermarchus, Immanuel Kant and Kenneth Kunen

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6 ideas

19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
Non-subject/predicate tautologies won't fit Kant's definition of analyticity [Shapiro on Kant]
     Full Idea: Not every proposition has a subject-predicate form, and so by contemporary lights Kant's definition of analyticity [predicate contained in subject] is unnatural and stifling. What of 'If it is raining now, then either it is raining or it is snowing'?
     From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781]) by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 4.2
     A reaction: Only a logician would want to assert something so pointless. Kant gives a pretty good account of normal language tautologies. Still, you can't deny the point.
How can bachelor 'contain' unmarried man? Are all analytic truths in subject-predicate form? [Miller,A on Kant]
     Full Idea: There are two problems with Kant's characterisation of analytic truths (as having 'the predicate contained within the subject'): what exactly does it mean to say that bachelor "contains" unmarried man?, and it is limited to subject-predicate sentences.
     From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781]) by Alexander Miller - Philosophy of Language 4.2
     A reaction: He picks these objections up from Quine. I always have reservations about Quine's supposed demolition of analytic truths, but there is no denying that these are two excellent problems which need addressing.
Analytic judgements say clearly what was in the concept of the subject [Kant]
     Full Idea: Analytic judgements say nothing in the predicate that was not already thought in the concept of the subject, though not so clearly and with the same consciousness. If I say all bodies are extended, I have not amplified my concept of body in the least.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 266)
     A reaction: If I say all bodies are made of atoms, have I extended my concept of 'body'? It would come as a sensational revelation for Aristotle, but it now seems analytic.
Analytic judgement rests on contradiction, since the predicate cannot be denied of the subject [Kant]
     Full Idea: Analytic judgements rest wholly on the principle of contradiction, …because the predicate cannot be denied of the subject without contradiction.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 267)
     A reaction: So if I say 'gold has atomic number 79', that is a (Kantian) analytic statement? This is the view of sceptics about Kripke's a posteriori necessity. …a few lines later Kant gives 'gold is a yellow metal' as an example.
If the predicate is contained in the subject of a judgement, it is analytic; otherwise synthetic [Kant]
     Full Idea: In judgements, the relation of subject to predicate is possible in two ways. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A as (covertly) contained in this concept A; or B lies entirely outside A. The first I call analytic, the second synthetic.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B010/A6)
     A reaction: Rey says this is the first introduction of the analytic/synthetic disctinction. Modern philosophers seem to reject this definition, mainly because they are suspicious of the vague word 'contained'. Depends what a concept is.
Analytic judgements clarify, by analysing the subject into its component predicates [Kant]
     Full Idea: One could call an analytic judgement one of clarification ...since the predicate does not add anything to the concept of the subject, but only breaks it up by means of analysis into its component concepts.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B011/A7)
     A reaction: This is a very illuminating view of the concept, which seems to have fallen into disrepute. If we ask what predicates are contained in 'tree', we may quickly have to embrace essentialism, to decide which predicates matter.