display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
5 ideas
| 22570 | Rhetoric now enables good speakers to become popular leaders [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Now, with the development of rhetoric, those who are able public speakers become popular leaders. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1305a12) | |
| A reaction: Demosthenes was an exact contemporary of Aristotle. Nowadays we are conscious of the 'dumbing down' by popular speakers, which is not the same as rhetoric. |
| 5849 | Rhetoric is a political offshoot of dialectic and ethics [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Rhetoric is a kind of offshoot of dialectic and of the study of ethics, and is quite properly categorized as political. | |
| From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1356a25) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle gives a higher status to rhetoric than Socrates and Plato did - and rightly, in my view. We have lost sight of it as a vital part of politics, and philosophers must fight for virtue in rhetoric, which requires right reason and fine principles. |
| 1705 | It doesn't have to be the case that in opposed views one is true and the other false [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is not necessary that of every affirmation and opposite negation one should be true and the other false. For what holds for things that are does not hold for things that are not but may possibly be or not be. | |
| From: Aristotle (On Interpretation [c.330 BCE], 19a39) | |
| A reaction: Thus even if Bivalence holds, and the only truth-values are T and F, it doesn't follow that Excluded Middle holds, which says that every proposition must have one of those two values. |
| 12368 | Negation takes something away from something [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The part of a contradictory pair which says something of something is an affirmation; the part which takes something from something is a negation. | |
| From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 72a14) | |
| A reaction: So affirmation is predication about an object ['Fa'], and negation is denial of predication. We have a scope problem: there is nothing which is F [¬∃x(Fx)], or there is a thing which is not-F [∃x(¬Fx)]. Aristotle seems to mean the latter. |
| 1692 | If you shouldn't argue in metaphors, then you shouldn't try to define them either [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If you should not argue in metaphors, it is plain too that you should neither define by metaphors nor define what is said in metaphors; for then you will necessarily argue in metaphors. | |
| From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 97b37) | |
| A reaction: Impeccable logic, but seeing a similarity can be a wonderful shortcut to seeing a great truth. |