display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
2 ideas
18121 | In logic a proposition means the same when it is and when it is not asserted [Bostock] |
Full Idea: In Modus Ponens where the first premise is 'P' and the second 'P→Q', in the first premise P is asserted but in the second it is not. Yet it must mean the same in both premises, or it would be guilty of the fallacy of equivocation. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 7.2) | |
A reaction: This is Geach's thought (leading to an objection to expressivism in ethics, that P means the same even if it is not expressed). |
2484 | The theory of the content of thought as 'Mentalese' explains why the Private Language Argument doesn't work [Fodor] |
Full Idea: If the Mentalese story about the content of thought is true, then there couldn't be a Private Language Argument. Good. That explains why there isn't one. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: Presumably Mentalese implies that all language is, in the first instance, intrinsically private. Dogs, for example, need Mentalese, since they self-evidently think. |