display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
62 ideas
| 2439 | Semantic externalism says the concept 'elm' needs no further beliefs or inferences [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: It is the essence of semantic externalism that there is nothing that you have to believe, there are no inferences that you have to accept, to have the concept 'elm'. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §2.I) | |
| A reaction: [REMINDER: broad content is filed in 18.C.7, under 'Thought' rather than under language. That is because I am a philospher of thought, rather than of language. |
| 2457 | If meaning is information, that establishes the causal link between the state of the world and our beliefs [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: It is the causal connection between the state of the world and the contents of beliefs that the reduction of meaning to information is designed to insure. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) | |
| A reaction: I'm not clear why characterising the contents of a belief in terms of its information has to amount to a 'reduction'. A cup of tea isn't reduced to tea. Connections imply duality. |
| 23450 | Wittgenstein rejected his earlier view that the form of language is the form of the world [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M] |
| Full Idea: Wittgenstein's later work rejects the central thesis of the Tractatus's philosophy of language, that the form of language is the same as the form of the world. | |
| From: report of Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952]) by Michael Morris - Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus Intro.4 | |
| A reaction: I associate the earlier view with the stoic belief that nature is wholly rational, and that our reasoning can match it. I take it for granted that language largely matches the world, but we must explain why so many people believe absurdities. |
| 23482 | The 'form' of the picture is its possible combinations [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: The form of depiction is the possibility that the things are combined with one another as are the elements of the picture. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 2.151) | |
| A reaction: This is why 'model' (or even 'simulation'?) is a better term than 'picture' for his proposal. Pictures are fixed, but models can be adjusted. |
| 23481 | Propositions assemble a world experimentally, like the model of a road accident [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: In the proposition a world is as it were put together experimentally. (As when in the law court in Paris a motor-car accident is represented by means of dolls, etc). | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Notebooks 1914-1916 [1915], 14.09.29) | |
| A reaction: [see Tractatus 4.031] This is the first appearance of LW's picture (or model) theory of meaning. It may well be the best theory of meaning anyone has come up with, since meaning being out in the world strikes me as absurd. |
| 18283 | Language pictures the essence of the world [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: The essence of language is a picture of the essence of the world. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Remarks [1930], p.85), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 17 | |
| A reaction: Hence for a long time the study of language seemed to be the way to do metaphysics. Now they study mathematical logic, with the same hope. |
| 2998 | Grice thinks meaning is inherited from the propositional attitudes which sentences express [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: According to Gricean theories of meaning, the meaning of a sentence is inherited from the propositional attitudes that the sentence is conventionally used to express. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (Psychosemantics [1987], p. 50) | |
| A reaction: Since the propositional attitudes contain propositions, this seems like a very plausible idea. If an indexical like 'I' is involved, the meaning of the sentence is not the same as its 'conventional' use. |
| 2482 | It seems unlikely that meaning can be reduced to communicative intentions, or any mental states [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: Nobody now thinks that the reduction of the meaning of English sentences to facts about the communicative intentions of English speakers - or to any facts about mental states - is likely to go through. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 6) | |
| A reaction: Most attempts at 'reduction' of meaning seem to go rather badly. I assume it would be very difficult to characterise 'intentions' without implicit reference to meaning. |
| 8172 | To understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: To understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 4.024) | |
| A reaction: This established the Frege truth-conditions theory of meaning, which was expanded by Davidson, and then possible worlds semantics. You can't assess truth without knowing meaning. Dummett says the two go together. |
| 18725 | A proposition draws a line around the facts which agree with it [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: A proposition gives reality a degree of freedom; it draws a line round the facts which agree with it, and distinguishes them from those which do not. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Lectures 1930-32 (student notes) [1931], B XIII.2) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be the idea of meaning as the range of truth conditions. Propositions as sets of possible worlds extends this into possible facts which agree with the proposition. Most facts neither agree nor disagree with some proposition. |
| 3006 | Whatever in the mind delivers falsehood is parasitic on what delivers truth [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: The mechanisms that deliver falsehoods are somehow parasitic on the ones that deliver truths. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (Psychosemantics [1987], p.107) | |
| A reaction: In the case of a sentence and its negation it is not clear which one is 'parasitic', because that can usually be reversed by paraphrasing. Historically, I very much hope that truth-speaking came first. |
| 2451 | To know the content of a thought is to know what would make it true [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: If you know the content of a thought, you thereby know what would make the thought true. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) | |
| A reaction: The truthmaker might by physically impossible, and careful thought might show it to be contradictory - but that wouldn't destroy the meaning. |
| 18282 | You can't believe it if you can't imagine a verification for it [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: It isn't possible to believe something for which you cannot imagine some kind of verification. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Remarks [1930], p.200), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 13 'Constr' | |
| A reaction: In 1930 LW was calling this his 'old principle'. As it stands here it is too vague to assert very much. |
| 18728 | The meaning of a proposition is the mode of its verification [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: The meaning of a proposition is the mode of its verification (and two propositions cannot have the same verification). | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Lectures 1930-32 (student notes) [1931], C I) | |
| A reaction: Does this mean that if two sentences have the same mode of verification, then they must be expressing the same proposition? I guess so. |
| 7086 | Good philosophy asserts science, and demonstrates the meaninglessness of metaphysics [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: The correct method in philosophy would be to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science, and whenever someone wanted to say something metaphysical, to show that he had failed to give a meaning to signs in his propositions. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 6.53) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be the germ of logical positivism, picked up by the Vienna Circle, and passed on the Ayer and co. How, though, do you 'show' that a sign is meaningless? Very abstract ideas are too far away from experience to be analysed that way. |
| 4150 | Asking about verification is only one way of asking about the meaning of a proposition [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: Asking whether and how a proposition can be verified is only a particular way of asking 'How do you mean?' The answer is a contribution to the grammar of the proposition. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §353) | |
| A reaction: 'How' a proposition is verified seems utterly irrelevant. What situation in reality provides the verification must have something to do with the meaning. Cat-on-mat is what counts, not whether you see it, hear it or smell it. |
| 3007 | Many different verification procedures can reach 'star', but it only has one semantic value [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: Verification procedures connect terms with their denotations in too many ways. Different routes to 'star' do not determine different semantic values for 'star'. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (Psychosemantics [1987], p.125) | |
| A reaction: This fairly conclusively shows that meaning is not 'the method of verification' - but that wasn't a difficult target to hit. |
| 6567 | For Wittgenstein, words are defined by their use, just as chess pieces are [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin] |
| Full Idea: For Wittgenstein, just as pieces in a game such as chess are defined by the rules that govern their moves, the meanings of words are similarly defined by the rules that govern their employment. | |
| From: report of Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.2 | |
| A reaction: Fogelin's note points out that it is more complex than this. It is hard to dispute the chess case, but while words like 'and' and 'not' may be given entirely functional definitions, others don't work like that: John, run, red, solid, pain, ow! …. |
| 6169 | We do not achieve meaning and understanding in our heads, but in the world [Wittgenstein, by Rowlands] |
| Full Idea: For Wittgenstein, meaning and understanding are not things that we do or achieve in our heads; they are things we achieve in the world. | |
| From: report of Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §202) by Mark Rowlands - Externalism Ch.5 | |
| A reaction: Can't we achieve anything in our heads? Mental arithmetic seems to be fairly mental, unless we are going to be absurdly behaviouristic. If we can achieve some things in our heads, why not lots of things? |
| 4155 | We all seem able to see quite clearly how sentences represent things when we use them [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: It it be asked, "How do sentences manage to represent?" the answer might be, "Don't you know? You certainly see it when you use them." For nothing is concealed. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §435) | |
| A reaction: A tool isn't its use, even though it becomes obvious how a tool works when it is used. It has a use because it has a certain nature or property. |
| 3004 | The meaning of a sentence derives from its use in expressing an attitude [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: The meaning of a sentence derives from its use in expressing an attitude. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (Psychosemantics [1987], p. 79) | |
| A reaction: Among other things. It can also arrive from a desire to remember something. A sentence can also acquire meaning compositionally (by assembling) with no use or aim. |
| 4137 | In the majority of cases the meaning of a word is its use in the language [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: For a large class of cases - though not for all - the meaning of a word is its use in the language. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §043) | |
| A reaction: Defended by Paul Horwich, but I don't like this. If "swordfish" is a password, its meaning and its use are miles apart. Meaning connects to reality, but use doesn't. |
| 18705 | Words function only in propositions, like levers in a machine [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: Words function only in propositions, like the levers in a machine. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Lectures 1930-32 (student notes) [1931], A I.4) | |
| A reaction: Hm. Consider the word 'tree'. Did you manage to do it? Was it just a noise? |
| 4142 | To understand a sentence means to understand a language [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: To understand a sentence means to understand a language. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §198) | |
| A reaction: Does this make learning a language logically impossible? Helen Keller only knew one word at the beginning. |
| 3000 | Meaning holism is a crazy doctrine [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: Meaning holism really is a crazy doctrine. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (Psychosemantics [1987], p. 60) | |
| A reaction: Yes. What is not crazy is a contextualist account of utterances, and a recognition of the contextual and relational ingredient in the meanings of most of our sentences. |
| 2433 | For holists no two thoughts are ever quite the same, which destroys faith in meaning [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: If what you are thinking depends on all of what you believe, then nobody ever thinks the same thing twice. …That is why so many semantic holists (Quine, Putnam, Rorty, Churchland, probably Wittgenstein) end up being semantic eliminativists. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §1.2b) | |
| A reaction: If linguistic holism is nonsense, this is easily settled. What I say about breakfast is not changed by reading some Gibbon yesterday. |
| 2477 | If to understand "fish" you must know facts about them, where does that end? [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: If learning that fish typically live in streams is part of learning "fish", typical utterances of "pet fish" (living in bowls) are counterexamples. This argument iterates (e.g "big pet fish"). So learning where they live can't be part of learning "fish". | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 5) | |
| A reaction: Using 'typical' twice is rather misleading here. Town folk can learn 'fish' as typically living in bowls. There is no one way to learn a word meaning. |
| 3003 | Very different mental states can share their contents, so content doesn't seem to be constructed from functional role [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: It's an embarrassment for attempts to construct content from functional role that quite different sorts of mental states can nevertheless share their contents. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (Psychosemantics [1987], p. 70) | |
| A reaction: That is, presumably, one content having two different roles. Two contents with the same role is 'multiple realisability'. Pain can tell me I'm damaged, or reveal that my damaged nerves are healing. Problem? |
| 12634 | 'Inferential-role semantics' says meaning is determined by role in inference [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: 'Inferential-role semantics' claims that the meaning of a word (/the content of a concept) is determined by its role in inference. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.2.1.2 n14) | |
| A reaction: Fodor is deeply opposed to this view. At first blush it sounds wrong to me, since there seems to be plenty of thought that can go on before inference takes place. Daydreamy speculation, for example. |
| 2996 | Mental states may have the same content but different extensions [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: The identity of the content of mental states does not ensure the identity of their extensions. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (Psychosemantics [1987], p. 45) | |
| A reaction: Obviously if I am thinking each day about 'my sheep', that won't change if I am unaware that one of them died this morning. …Because I didn’t have the precise number of sheep in mind. |
| 4721 | If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (On Certainty [1951], §114) | |
| A reaction: A wonderfully challenging aphorism. I suspect that it is true, but not really a problem. We all know the meaning of 'Loch Ness Monster', as long as we don't get too fussy. And for local objects I am happy that I know the facts. |
| 4149 | We don't have 'meanings' in our minds in addition to verbal expressions [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: When I think in language, there aren't 'meanings' going through my mind in addition to the verbal expressions. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §329) | |
| A reaction: No, but words have properties, like being meaningful, or long, or beautiful. They are not abstractions, or empty counters which can be used for anything. |
| 4156 | Make the following experiment: say "It's cold here" and mean "It's warm here" [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: Make the following experiment: say "It's cold here" and mean "It's warm here". | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §510) | |
| A reaction: A lovely experiment, whatever it proves. It is easier if the meaning is the truth, rather than the words. I try to weld a new word onto my experience. |
| 12642 | Co-referring terms differ if they have different causal powers [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: The representation of 'morning star' must be different from 'evening star' because their tokens differ in their causal powers. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.3.3) | |
| A reaction: This is Fodor trying to avoid the standard Fregean move of proposing that there are 'senses' as well as references. See Idea 12629. If these two terms have the same extension, they are the same concept? They 'seem' to have two referents. |
| 12663 | We refer to individuals and to properties, and we use singular terms and predicates [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: I assume that there are two kinds of reference: reference to individuals and to properties. This means, from the syntactic point of view, that the vehicles of reference are exhaustively singular terms and predicates. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.7) | |
| A reaction: The immediate possibility that comes to mind is plural quantification. See George Boolos, who confidently says that he can refer to 'some Cheerios' in his breakfast bowl, and communicate very well. He then looks to formalise such talk. |
| 4145 | How do words refer to sensations? [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: How do words refer to sensations? | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §244) | |
| A reaction: A very nice question, to be remembered when discussing how we refer to beauty, gold, water or the present King of France. |
| 4140 | The standard metre in Paris is neither one metre long nor not one metre long [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: There is one thing of which one can say neither that it is one metre long, nor that it is not one metre long, and that is the standard metre in Paris. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §050) | |
| A reaction: The remark which inspired Kripke's causal theory. Clearly W. is wrong, because it is one metre long, but why is it that length? |
| 2436 | It is claimed that reference doesn't fix sense (Jocasta), and sense doesn't fix reference (Twin Earth) [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: The standard view is that Frege cases [knowing Jocasta but not mother] show that reference doesn't determine sense, and Twin cases [knowing water but not H2O] show that sense doesn't determine reference. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §1.3) | |
| A reaction: How about 'references don't contain much information', and 'descriptions may not fix what they are referring to'? Simple really. |
| 2434 | Broad semantics holds that the basic semantic properties are truth and denotation [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: Broad semantic theories generally hold that the basic semantic properties of thoughts are truth and denotation. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §1.2b) | |
| A reaction: I think truth and denotation are the basic semantic properties, but I am dubious about whole-hearted broad semantic theories, so I seem to have gone horribly wrong somewhere. |
| 12616 | English has no semantic theory, just associations between sentences and thoughts [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: English has no semantics. Learning English isn't learning a theory about what its sentences mean, it's learning how to associate its sentences with the corresponding thoughts. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (Concepts:where cogn.science went wrong [1998], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: This sounds remarkably close to John Locke's account of language (which I always thought was seriously underrated). Presumably we can then say that the 'thought' (or Locke's 'idea') is the meaning, which is old-fashioned real meanings. |
| 12645 | Semantics (esp. referential semantics) allows inferences from utterances to the world [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: All you need for inferring from John's utterance to the world is the sort of thing that a semantics (i.e. referential semantics) provides. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.3.5) | |
| A reaction: Fodor is very good at saying nice simple things like that. But it is not enough to infer what objects are being discussed. All the hard cases must be covered (denials of existence, reference to non-existence, intentional contexts, modal claims). |
| 12646 | Semantics relates to the world, so it is never just psychological [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: Semantics is about constitutive relations between representations and the world. There is, as a matter of principle, no such thing as a psychological theory of meaning. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.3.5) | |
| A reaction: The second sentence is in capital letters, but I am still not convinced. The classic difficulty seems to be that you have to use language to pick out the things in the world that are being referred to. Of course, at some point you just see the objects. |
| 23511 | Propositions use old expressions for a new sense [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: A proposition must use old expressions to communicate a new sense. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 4.03) | |
| A reaction: A nicely expressed affirmation of the principle of compositionality. It entails that the propositions can be either true or false, according to LW. |
| 23488 | Propositions are understood via their constituents [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: A proposition is understood by anyone who understands its constituents. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 4.024) | |
| A reaction: The 'constituents' had better include the grammatical relationships. Otherwise it's 'rearrange these words to make a well known saying'. That said, this strikes me as an important truth about language. We assemble sentence meanings. |
| 2459 | Externalist semantics are necessary to connect the contents of beliefs with how the world is [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: You need an externalist semantics to explain why the contents of beliefs should have anything to do with how the world is. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) | |
| A reaction: Since externalist semantics only emerged in the 1970s, that implies that no previous theory had any notion that language had some connection to how the world is. Eh? |
| 18711 | A proposition is any expression which can be significantly negated [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: Any affirmation can be negated: if it has sense to say p it also has sense to say ¬p. ...A proposition therefore is any expression which can be significantly negated. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Lectures 1930-32 (student notes) [1931], B I.2) | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure about 'therefore'. I'm thinking you would have to already grasp the proposition in order to apply his negation test. |
| 23486 | Pictures are possible situations in logical space [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: A picture represents a possible situation in logical space. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 2.202) | |
| A reaction: This seems pretty close to the idea that propositions are sets of possible worlds (though that seems to add unnecessary extra baggage). If they just picture situations, why does he mention logical space? Within the limits of possible picturing? |
| 23490 | A thought is mental constituents that relate to reality as words do [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: Does a Gedanke [thought] consist of words? No! But of psychical constituents that have the same sort of relation to reality as words. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Letters to Russell [1919], p.125), quoted by Michael Morris - Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus 4B | |
| A reaction: This is roughly my view of propositions, as non-lingustic mental events. The 'psychical constituents' seem to be concepts, in a psychological rather than a Fregean sense. This idea allowed transfer of his representation theory from thought to language. |
| 2473 | Analysis is impossible without the analytic/synthetic distinction [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: If there is no analytic/synthetic distinction then there are no analyses. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 3) | |
| A reaction: There are no precise analyses. I see no reason why a holistic view of language prohibits the careful elucidation of key concepts in the system. It's just a bit fluid. |
| 23497 | Solipsism is correct, but can only be shown, not said, by the limits of my personal language [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: What the solipsist means is quite correct; only it cannot be said, but makes itself manifest. The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language which I alone understand) mean the limits of my world. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 5.62) | |
| A reaction: I take it that LW later showed that the remark in brackets is absurd, using his Private Language argument. Commentators seem unclear about how seriously to take this claim. |
| 6166 | Was Wittgenstein's problem between individual and community, or between occasions for an individual? [Rowlands on Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: There are two interpretations of Wittgenstein here: the community interpretation sees error in a rule between the individual and the community, where the individual interpretation sees the problem between repeated occasions in the use of a sign. | |
| From: comment on Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §202) by Mark Rowlands - Externalism Ch.5 | |
| A reaction: Rowlands brings out how a lot hangs on which of these two interpretations we opt for, but also that if the individual has a problem, this may logically imply the same problem for the community. The individual interpretation would be a deeper problem. |
| 7875 | If a brilliant child invented a name for a private sensation, it couldn't communicate it [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: Let's assume the child is a genius and itself invents a name for the sensation! - But then, of course, he couldn't make himself understood when he used the word. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §257) | |
| A reaction: [His example is a sensation with no behaviour] Sensations are not just related to behaviour; they are related to external objects, and to parts of the body. We doubt the sensations of others if they can't name the object or the body part. |
| 4146 | We cannot doublecheck mental images for correctness (or confirm news with many copies of the paper) [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: If the mental image of a train timetable cannot itself be tested for correctness, how can it confirm the correctness of the first memory? (As if someone were to buy several copies of the morning paper to assure himself that what it said was true). | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §265) | |
| A reaction: An important point for the epistemological sceptic. Could God do an infinite regress of checks on the truth of his mental images? |
| 4147 | If we only named pain by our own case, it would be like naming beetles by looking in a private box [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: If someone says he only knows what pain is from his own case, suppose everyone had a box with something in it (a 'beetle'). We can't see into other boxes, so we say what a beetle is by looking in our own box. The contents of each box could be different. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §293) | |
| A reaction: But pain is private. Children must guess the meaning of parts of the language that refer to inner experience, like 'sad' or 'hopeful'. Body language brings our private concepts together, but error seems possible. |
| 5659 | If the reference is private, that is incompatible with the sense being public [Wittgenstein, by Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Wittgenstein's claim is that the assumption that the reference is private (being observable to one person alone) is incompatible with the hypothesis that the sense is public. | |
| From: report of Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §293) by Roger Scruton - Short History of Modern Philosophy Ch.19 | |
| A reaction: An illuminating summary, showing the link between the private language argument and modern 'externalism' about the meaning of concepts (e.g. Idea 4099). I still don't find Wittgenstein's claim conclusive. Something is definitely private. |
| 4152 | Getting from perceptions to words cannot be a private matter; the rules need an institution of use [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: I could not apply any rules to a private transition from what is seen to words. Here the rules really would hang in the air; for the institution of their use is lacking. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §380) | |
| A reaction: That puts the argument nicely. In studying art or wine you learn what to say about your private experiences. |
| 2484 | The theory of the content of thought as 'Mentalese' explains why the Private Language Argument doesn't work [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: If the Mentalese story about the content of thought is true, then there couldn't be a Private Language Argument. Good. That explains why there isn't one. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 6) | |
| A reaction: Presumably Mentalese implies that all language is, in the first instance, intrinsically private. Dogs, for example, need Mentalese, since they self-evidently think. |
| 4136 | To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §019) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be about the transparency of language, but it supports meaning as truth conditions, rather than as use. |
| 23489 | We translate by means of proposition constituents, not by whole propositions [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: When translating one language into another, we do not proceed by translating each proposition of the one into a proposition of the other, but merely by translating the constituents of propositions. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 4.025) | |
| A reaction: This seems opposed to Quine's later holistic view of translating whole languages. Is he objecting to Frege's context principle? |
| 6318 | The doctrine of indeterminacy of translation seems implied by the later Wittgenstein [Wittgenstein, by Quine] |
| Full Idea: Perhaps the doctrine of indeterminacy of translation will have little air of paradox for readers familiar with Wittgenstein's latter-day remarks on meaning. | |
| From: report of Ludwig Wittgenstein (The Blue and Brown Notebooks [1936], II.§16 n) by Willard Quine - Word and Object II.§16 n | |
| A reaction: This may be right, and I am inclined to link the names of Wittgenstein and Quine among those who led philosophy up a relativistic and sceptical cul-de-sac for many years. You can think too hard, you know. |
| 4144 | Common human behaviour enables us to interpret an unknown language [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: The common behaviour of mankind is the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §206) | |
| A reaction: This is a behaviourist spin on the idea of charity, but it leads to Davidson's assumption that most alien beliefs must be true. |
| 11049 | To communicate, language needs agreement in judgment as well as definition [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §242) | |
| A reaction: If someone is locked into a highly alien viewpoint, then communication with them does seem to be virtually impossible. Amenability to reason, and consensus on elementary facts, seems to be the sine qua non of communication. |