Combining Philosophers

Ideas for John Buridan, Willard Quine and Jonathan D. Jacobs

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5 ideas

19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense

18967	A 'proposition' is said to be the timeless cognitive part of the meaning of a sentence [Quine]
	Full Idea: A 'proposition' is the meaning of a sentence. More precisely, since propositions are supposed to be true or false once and for all, it is the meaning of an eternal sentence. More precisely still, it is the 'cognitive' meaning, involving truth, not poetry.
	From: Willard Quine (Propositional Objects [1965], p.139)
	A reaction: Quine defines this in order to attack it. I equate a proposition with a thought, and take a sentence to be an attempt to express a proposition. I have no idea why they are supposed to be 'timeless'. Philosophers have some very odd ideas.

19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique

18968	The problem with propositions is their individuation. When do two sentences express one proposition? [Quine]
	Full Idea: The trouble with propositions, as cognitive meanings of eternal sentences, is individuation. Given two eternal sentences, themselves visibly different linguistically, it is not sufficiently clear under when to say that they mean the same proposition.
	From: Willard Quine (Propositional Objects [1965], p.140)
	A reaction: If a group of people agree that two sentences mean the same thing, which happens all the time, I don't see what gives Quine the right to have a philosophical moan about some dubious activity called 'individuation'.

9007	It makes no sense to say that two sentences express the same proposition [Quine]
	Full Idea: My objection to propositions is not parsimony, or disapproval of abstract entities, ..but that propositions induce a relation of synonymy or equivalence between sentences (expressing the same proposition), and this makes no objective sense.
	From: Willard Quine (Philosophy of Logic [1970], Ch.1)
	A reaction: Personally I think propositions are unavoidable when you try to connect language to activities of the brain, and also when you consider animal thought. And also when you introspect about your own language processes. Mr Quine, he wrong.

9008	There is no rule for separating the information from other features of sentences [Quine]
	Full Idea: There is no evident rule for separating the information from the stylistic or other immaterial features of the sentences.
	From: Willard Quine (Philosophy of Logic [1970], Ch.1)
	A reaction: There is no rule for deciding precisely when night falls, so I don't believe in night. I take a proposition, prima facie, as an answer to the question 'What exactly do you mean by that remark?' How do you extract logical form from sentences?

9010	We can abandon propositions, and just talk of sentences and equivalence [Quine]
	Full Idea: Why not just talk of sentences and equivalence and let the propositions go? Propositions have been projected as shadows of sentences, but at best they will give us nothing the sentences will not give.
	From: Willard Quine (Philosophy of Logic [1970], Ch.1)
	A reaction: I don't understand how you decide that two sentences are equivalent. 'There's someone in that wood'; 'yes, there's a person amongst those trees'. Identical truth-conditions. We can formulate a non-linguistic fact about those truth-conditions.