display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
11 ideas
| 18418 | A theory of perspectival de se content gives truth conditions relative to an agent [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever] |
| Full Idea: Lewis's theory of a perspectival 'de se' content ...delivers truth conditions not absolutely, but only relative to a choice of agent/center. | |
| From: report of David Lewis (Attitudes De Dicto and De Se [1979]) by Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh - The Inessential Indexical 05.7 | |
| A reaction: The proposal rests on a theory of 'centred' possible worlds, specifying the viewpoint of some agent within the whole system. It relies on accepting the idea that indexicals are special, which Cappelen and Dever reject. |
| 16278 | A particular functional role is what gives content to a thought [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Anything that is a thinker at all has a thought with a certain content in virtue of being in a state which occupies a certain functional role. | |
| From: David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 2.3) | |
| A reaction: So often Lewis seems to get things the wrong way round. Maybe if you invert his entire (fabulously consistent) philosophy, you get the right answer? I take the content to be what makes the role possible. |
| 14215 | Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Whatever happens in special cases, causal theories usually make it easy to be wrong about the thing we refer to. | |
| From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'What Is') | |
| A reaction: I suppose the point of this is that there are no checks and balances to keep reference in focus, but just a requirement to keep connected to an increasingly attenuated causal chain. |
| 14209 | Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Description theories of reference are supposed to have been well and truly refuted. I think not: ..it is still tenable with my seven points, and part of the truth of reference [7: rigidity, egocentric, tokens, causal, imperfect, indeterminate, families]. | |
| From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'Glob Desc') | |
| A reaction: (The bit at the end refers to his seven points, on p.59). He calls his basic proposal 'causal descriptivism', incorporating his seven slight modifications of traditional descriptivism about reference. |
| 8420 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: I identify a proposition with the set of possible worlds where it is true. | |
| From: David Lewis (Causation [1973], p.193) | |
| A reaction: As it stands, I'm baffled by this. How can 'it is raining' be a set of possible worlds? I assume it expands to refer to the truth-conditions, among possibilities as well as actualities. 'It is raining' fits all worlds where it is raining. |
| 9654 | A proposition is a set of entire possible worlds which instantiate a particular property [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: I identify propositions with certain properties - namely, with those that are instantiated only by entire possible worlds. Then if properties generally are the sets of their instances, a proposition is a set of possible worlds. | |
| From: David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 1.5) | |
| A reaction: I don't get this. How can the proposition that tomatoes are edible be an entire set of possible worlds? The proposition seems to be about tomatoes, and nothing else. Should we talk of 'possibilities', rather than of 'possible worlds'? |
| 15736 | A proposition is the property of being a possible world where it holds true [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: I identify propositions with properties that are instantiated only by entire possible worlds. If properties are the sets of their instances, a proposition is a set of possible worlds. A proposition is the property of being a world where it holds. | |
| From: David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 1.5) | |
| A reaction: This is so far away from my concept of a proposition (as a truth-evaluable representational mental event) that I struggle to compute it. So the proposition that I am sitting here is the property of 'being the actual world'. Eh? |
| 15738 | Propositions can't have syntactic structure if they are just sets of worlds [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: If it is central to 'proposition' that there be quasi-syntactic structure, so that there are subject-predicate, or negative, or conjunctive, or quantified propositions, then sets of possible worlds will not do. | |
| From: David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 1.5) | |
| A reaction: He proposes 'more complicated set-theoretic constructions out of possibilia' instead. I am very much committed to propositions having quasi-syntactic structure. |
| 8614 | A sophisticated principle of charity sometimes imputes error as well as truth [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Unlike principles of crude charity, sophisticated principles of charity call for imputations of error in the subject if he has lived in deceptive conditions. | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Cont of L') | |
| A reaction: This begs lots of questions about how you decide conditions are 'deceptive' if you have not yet embarked on your radical interpretation of the subject. Davidson's point still stands, that imputing truth must be the normal procedure. |
| 8615 | We need natural properties in order to motivate the principle of charity [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: We need natural properties, so that the principle of charity will impute a bias towards believing that things are green rather than grue, and towards a basic desire for long life, rather than long-life-unless-one-was-born-on-a-Monday.... | |
| From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Cont of L') | |
| A reaction: Lewis always seems to be approaching things from the wrong end. We don't need properties so that we can attribute charity, so that we can interpret. We interpret, because we can be charitable, because we all experience natural properties. |
| 15539 | Basic to pragmatics is taking a message in a way that makes sense of it [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: The cardinal principle of pragmatics is that the right way to take what is said, if at all possible, is the way that makes sense of the message. | |
| From: David Lewis (Many, but almost one [1993], 'A better solution') | |
| A reaction: Thus when someone misuses a word, suggesting nonsense, we gloss over it, often without even mentioning it, because the underlying sense is obvious. A good argument for the existence of propositions. Lewis doesn't mention truth. |