display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
6 ideas
4974 | For all the multiplicity of languages, mankind has a common stock of thoughts [Frege] |
Full Idea: For all the multiplicity of languages, mankind has a common stock of thoughts. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (On Concept and Object [1892], p.196n) | |
A reaction: Given the acknowledgement here that two very different sentences in different languages can express the same thought, he should recognise that at least some aspects of a thought are non-linguistic. |
16873 | Thoughts are not subjective or psychological, because some thoughts are the same for us all [Frege] |
Full Idea: A thought is not something subjective, is not the product of any form of mental activity; for the thought that we have in Pythagoras's theorem is the same for everybody. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Logic in Mathematics [1914], p.206) | |
A reaction: When such thoughts are treated as if the have objective (platonic) existence, I become bewildered. I take a thought (or proposition) to be entirely psychological, but that doesn't stop two people from having the same thought. |
16872 | A thought is the sense expressed by a sentence, and is what we prove [Frege] |
Full Idea: The sentence is of value to us because of the sense that we grasp in it, which is recognisably the same in a translation. I call this sense the thought. What we prove is not a sentence, but a thought. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Logic in Mathematics [1914], p.206) | |
A reaction: The 'sense' is presumably the German 'sinn', and a 'thought' in Frege is what we normally call a 'proposition'. So the sense of a sentence is a proposition, and logic proves propositions. I'm happy with that. |
19467 | A 'thought' is something for which the question of truth can arise; thoughts are senses of sentences [Frege] |
Full Idea: I call a 'thought' something for which the question of truth can arise at all. ...So I can say: thoughts are senses of sentences, without wishing to assert that the sense of every sentence is a thought. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (The Thought: a Logical Enquiry [1918], p.327-8 (61)) | |
A reaction: This builds on his distinction between sense and reference. The reference of every truth sentence is just 'the true', and the sense is the proposition. The concept of a proposition seems indispensable to logic, I would say. |
16874 | The parts of a thought map onto the parts of a sentence [Frege] |
Full Idea: A sentence is generally a complex sign, so the thought expressed by it is complex too: in fact it is put together in such a way that parts of a thought correspond to parts of the sentence. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Logic in Mathematics [1914], p.207) | |
A reaction: This is the compositional view of propositions, as opposed to the holistic view. |
19472 | A sentence is only a thought if it is complete, and has a time-specification [Frege] |
Full Idea: Only a sentence with the time-specification filled out, a sentence complete in every respect, expresses a thought. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (The Thought: a Logical Enquiry [1918], p.343(76)) | |
A reaction: I take the 'every respect' to include the avoidance of ambiguity, and some sort of perspicacious reference for the terms. I wish philosophers would focus on the thoughts in their subject, and not nit-pick about the sentences. Does he mean 'utterances'? |