display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
2 ideas
11076 | Community implies assertability-conditions rather than truth-conditions semantics [Kripke, by Hanna] |
Full Idea: If we take account of the fact that a speaker is in a community, then we must adopt an assertability-conditions semantics (based on what is legitimately assertible), and reject truth-conditional semantics (based on correspondence to the facts). | |
From: report of Saul A. Kripke (Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language [1982]) by Robert Hanna - Rationality and Logic 6.1 | |
A reaction: [Part of Hanna's full summary of Kripke's argument] This sounds wrong to me. There are conditions where it is agreed that a lie should be told. Two people can be guilty of the same malapropism. |
14893 | Rigid designation creates a puzzle - why do some necessary truths appear to be contingent? [Kripke, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro] |
Full Idea: Kripke's proposal that referential expressions like indexicals, demonstratives, proper names and natural kind terms are de jure rigid designators created a puzzle - it entails 'modal illusions', truths that are in fact necessary appear to be contingent. | |
From: report of Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], p.143-4) by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro - Introduction to 'Two-Dimensional Semantics' 1 | |
A reaction: They are identifying this puzzle as the source of the need for two-dimensional semantics. Kripke notes that rigid designators may have their reference fixed by non-rigid descriptions. |