Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Alistair Mitchell, Robert C. Stalnaker and Alexander Miller

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21 ideas

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
16406 If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker]
7324 Explain meaning by propositional attitudes, or vice versa, or together? [Miller,A]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
16404 In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker]
16432 One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
16403 'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts [Stalnaker]
16461 We still lack an agreed semantics for quantifiers in natural language [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
16401 To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true [Stalnaker]
7323 If truth is deflationary, sentence truth-conditions just need good declarative syntax [Miller,A]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
16410 Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker]
16448 Possible world semantics may not reduce modality, but it can explain it [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
16430 Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension [Stalnaker]
16431 In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content [Stalnaker]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
16442 I take propositions to be truth conditions [Stalnaker]
16447 A theory of propositions at least needs primitive properties of consistency and of truth [Stalnaker]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
14616 A 'Russellian proposition' is an ordered sequence of individual, properties and relations [Stalnaker]
16446 Propositions presumably don't exist if the things they refer to don't exist [Stalnaker]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
7315 'Jones is a married bachelor' does not have the logical form of a contradiction [Miller,A]
19. Language / F. Communication / 2. Assertion
18052 An assertion aims to add to the content of a context [Stalnaker, by Magidor]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
14718 An assertion is an attempt to rule out certain possibilities, narrowing things down for good planning [Stalnaker, by Schroeter]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
7328 The principle of charity is holistic, saying we must hold most of someone's system of beliefs to be true [Miller,A]
7329 Maybe we should interpret speakers as intelligible, rather than speaking truth [Miller,A]