Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Allan Gibbard, E.J. Lowe and George Engelbretsen
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8 ideas
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
7722
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If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 2. Denoting
18918
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Terms denote objects with properties, and statements denote the world with that property [Engelbretsen]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
16550
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Direct reference doesn't seem to require that thinkers know what it is they are thinking about [Lowe]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
14071
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Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria [Gibbard]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
18920
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'Socrates is wise' denotes a sentence; 'that Socrates is wise' denotes a proposition [Engelbretsen]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
6632
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The same proposition provides contents for the that-clause of an utterance and a belief [Lowe]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
6631
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If propositions are abstract entities, how can minds depend on their causal powers? [Lowe]
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19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
18906
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Negating a predicate term and denying its unnegated version are quite different [Engelbretsen]
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