Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Anaxarchus, David Kaplan and Stephen Yablo
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9 ideas
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
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18992
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Sentence-meaning is the truth-conditions - plus factors responsible for them [Yablo]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
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11967
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Sentences might have the same sense when logically equivalent - or never have the same sense [Kaplan]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
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14080
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Are causal descriptions part of the causal theory of reference, or are they just metasemantic? [Kaplan, by Schaffer,J]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
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18994
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The content of an assertion can be quite different from compositional content [Yablo]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
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18997
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Truth-conditions as subject-matter has problems of relevance, short cut, and reversal [Yablo]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
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14894
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Indexicals have a 'character' (the standing meaning), and a 'content' (truth-conditions for one context) [Kaplan, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro]
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14700
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'Content' gives the standard modal profile, and 'character' gives rules for a context [Kaplan, by Schroeter]
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19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
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19005
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Not-A is too strong to just erase an improper assertion, because it actually reverses A [Yablo]
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19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / d. Metaphor
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8861
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Hardly a word in the language is devoid of metaphorical potential [Yablo]
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