Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Anon (Lev), Michael Dummett and Paul O'Grady
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21 ideas
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
19055
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Stating a sentence's truth-conditions is just paraphrasing the sentence [Dummett]
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19056
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If a sentence is effectively undecidable, we can never know its truth conditions [Dummett]
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8168
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To know the truth-conditions of a sentence, you must already know the meaning [Dummett]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
8193
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Verification is not an individual but a collective activity [Dummett]
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8181
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A justificationist theory of meaning leads to the rejection of classical logic [Dummett]
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8182
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Verificationism could be realist, if we imagined the verification by a superhuman power [Dummett]
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8183
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If truths about the past depend on memories and current evidence, the past will change [Dummett]
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4710
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Verificationism was attacked by the deniers of the analytic-synthetic distinction, needed for 'facts' [O'Grady]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
19054
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Meaning as use puts use beyond criticism, and needs a holistic view of language [Dummett]
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8176
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We could only guess the meanings of 'true' and 'false' when sentences were used [Dummett]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
8170
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Sentences are the primary semantic units, because they can say something [Dummett]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
19064
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Holism is not a theory of meaning; it is the denial that a theory of meaning is possible [Dummett]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
10516
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A realistic view of reference is possible for concrete objects, but not for abstract objects [Dummett, by Hale]
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9181
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The causal theory of reference can't distinguish just hearing a name from knowing its use [Dummett]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
9836
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Fregean semantics assumes a domain articulated into individual objects [Dummett]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
8189
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Truth-condition theorists must argue use can only be described by appeal to conditions of truth [Dummett]
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8191
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The truth-conditions theory must get agreement on a conception of truth [Dummett]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
8169
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We can't distinguish a proposition from its content [Dummett]
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19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
4717
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If we abandon the analytic-synthetic distinction, scepticism about meaning may be inevitable [O'Grady]
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19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / a. Translation
4706
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Early Quine says all beliefs could be otherwise, but later he said we would assume mistranslation [O'Grady]
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19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
4734
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Cryptographers can recognise that something is a language, without translating it [O'Grady]
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