Combining Philosophers

Ideas for B Hale / C Wright, Keith Donnellan and Peter Goldie

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these philosophers

display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers

---

6 ideas

19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference

12231

Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright]

19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description

10435

A definite description 'the F' is referential if the speaker could thereby be referring to something not-F [Donnellan, by Sainsbury]

10451

Donnellan is unclear whether the referential-attributive distinction is semantic or pragmatic [Bach on Donnellan]

5813	A description can successfully refer, even if its application to the subject is not believed [Donnellan]

19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference

5815	Whether a definite description is referential or attributive depends on the speaker's intention [Donnellan]

19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths

10627

Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright]