Combining Philosophers
Ideas for B Hale / C Wright, Robert C. Stalnaker and Rudolph Carnap
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20 ideas
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
16406
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If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
16404
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In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker]
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16432
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One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content [Stalnaker]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
12231
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Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
16403
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'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts [Stalnaker]
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16461
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We still lack an agreed semantics for quantifiers in natural language [Stalnaker]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
16401
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To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true [Stalnaker]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
11968
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The intension of a sentence is the set of all possible worlds in which it is true [Carnap, by Kaplan]
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16410
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Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker]
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16448
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Possible world semantics may not reduce modality, but it can explain it [Stalnaker]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
16430
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Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension [Stalnaker]
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16431
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In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content [Stalnaker]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
16442
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I take propositions to be truth conditions [Stalnaker]
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16447
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A theory of propositions at least needs primitive properties of consistency and of truth [Stalnaker]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
14616
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A 'Russellian proposition' is an ordered sequence of individual, properties and relations [Stalnaker]
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16446
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Propositions presumably don't exist if the things they refer to don't exist [Stalnaker]
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19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
10627
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Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright]
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19. Language / F. Communication / 2. Assertion
18052
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An assertion aims to add to the content of a context [Stalnaker, by Magidor]
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19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
14718
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An assertion is an attempt to rule out certain possibilities, narrowing things down for good planning [Stalnaker, by Schroeter]
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19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / a. Translation
18285
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All translation loses some content (but language does not create reality) [Carnap]
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