Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Bonaventura, Jerry A. Fodor and Richard Sorabji
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24 ideas
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
2439
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Semantic externalism says the concept 'elm' needs no further beliefs or inferences [Fodor]
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2457
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If meaning is information, that establishes the causal link between the state of the world and our beliefs [Fodor]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
2998
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Grice thinks meaning is inherited from the propositional attitudes which sentences express [Fodor]
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2482
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It seems unlikely that meaning can be reduced to communicative intentions, or any mental states [Fodor]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
3006
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Whatever in the mind delivers falsehood is parasitic on what delivers truth [Fodor]
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2451
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To know the content of a thought is to know what would make it true [Fodor]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
3007
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Many different verification procedures can reach 'star', but it only has one semantic value [Fodor]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
3004
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The meaning of a sentence derives from its use in expressing an attitude [Fodor]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
3000
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Meaning holism is a crazy doctrine [Fodor]
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2433
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For holists no two thoughts are ever quite the same, which destroys faith in meaning [Fodor]
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2477
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If to understand "fish" you must know facts about them, where does that end? [Fodor]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
3003
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Very different mental states can share their contents, so content doesn't seem to be constructed from functional role [Fodor]
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12634
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'Inferential-role semantics' says meaning is determined by role in inference [Fodor]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
2996
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Mental states may have the same content but different extensions [Fodor]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
12642
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Co-referring terms differ if they have different causal powers [Fodor]
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12663
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We refer to individuals and to properties, and we use singular terms and predicates [Fodor]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
2436
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It is claimed that reference doesn't fix sense (Jocasta), and sense doesn't fix reference (Twin Earth) [Fodor]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
2434
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Broad semantics holds that the basic semantic properties are truth and denotation [Fodor]
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12616
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English has no semantic theory, just associations between sentences and thoughts [Fodor]
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12645
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Semantics (esp. referential semantics) allows inferences from utterances to the world [Fodor]
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12646
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Semantics relates to the world, so it is never just psychological [Fodor]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
2459
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Externalist semantics are necessary to connect the contents of beliefs with how the world is [Fodor]
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19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
2473
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Analysis is impossible without the analytic/synthetic distinction [Fodor]
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19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
2484
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The theory of the content of thought as 'Mentalese' explains why the Private Language Argument doesn't work [Fodor]
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