Combining Philosophers

Ideas for David J.Chalmers, A.J. Ayer and Timothy McGrew

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these philosophers

display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers

17 ideas

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
5181 A sentence is factually significant to someone if they know how to verify its proposition [Ayer]
5184 Factual propositions imply (in conjunction with a few other premises) possible experiences [Ayer]
5186 Tautologies and empirical hypotheses form the entire class of significant propositions [Ayer]
5164 A statement is meaningful if observation statements can be deduced from it [Ayer]
5165 Directly verifiable statements must entail at least one new observation statement [Ayer]
5166 The principle of verification is not an empirical hypothesis, but a definition [Ayer]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
14708 Rationalist 2D semantics posits necessary relations between meaning, apriority, and possibility [Chalmers, by Schroeter]
13958 The 'primary intension' is non-empirical, and fixes extensions based on the actual-world reference [Chalmers]
2399 Meaning has split into primary ("watery stuff"), and secondary counterfactual meaning ("H2O") [Chalmers]
13959 The 'secondary intension' is determined by rigidifying (as H2O) the 'water' picked out in the actual world [Chalmers]
13957 Primary and secondary intensions are the a priori (actual) and a posteriori (counterfactual) aspects of meaning [Chalmers]
13961 We have 'primary' truth-conditions for the actual world, and derived 'secondary' ones for counterfactual worlds [Chalmers]
14739 'Water' is two-dimensionally inconstant, with different intensions in different worlds [Chalmers, by Sider]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
5162 Sentences only express propositions if they are meaningful; otherwise they are 'statements' [Ayer]
13962 Two-dimensional semantics gives a 'primary' and 'secondary' proposition for each statement [Chalmers]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
2610 Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
13960 In two-dimensional semantics we have two aspects to truth in virtue of meaning [Chalmers]