Combining Philosophers
Ideas for David J.Chalmers, Michael Jubien and Peter F. Strawson
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16 ideas
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
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8356
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The meaning of an expression or sentence is general directions for its use, to refer or to assert [Strawson,P]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
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13377
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First-order logic tilts in favour of the direct reference theory, in its use of constants for objects [Jubien]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
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10430
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Reference is mainly a social phenomenon [Strawson,P, by Sainsbury]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
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10448
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If an expression can refer to anything, it may still instrinsically refer, but relative to a context [Bach on Strawson,P]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
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8355
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Expressions don't refer; people use expressions to refer [Strawson,P]
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8357
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If an utterance fails to refer then it is a pseudo-use, though a speaker may think they assert something [Strawson,P]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
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9281
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The idea of a predicate matches a range of things to which it can be applied [Strawson,P]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
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14708
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Rationalist 2D semantics posits necessary relations between meaning, apriority, and possibility [Chalmers, by Schroeter]
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13958
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The 'primary intension' is non-empirical, and fixes extensions based on the actual-world reference [Chalmers]
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2399
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Meaning has split into primary ("watery stuff"), and secondary counterfactual meaning ("H2O") [Chalmers]
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13959
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The 'secondary intension' is determined by rigidifying (as H2O) the 'water' picked out in the actual world [Chalmers]
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13957
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Primary and secondary intensions are the a priori (actual) and a posteriori (counterfactual) aspects of meaning [Chalmers]
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13961
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We have 'primary' truth-conditions for the actual world, and derived 'secondary' ones for counterfactual worlds [Chalmers]
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14739
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'Water' is two-dimensionally inconstant, with different intensions in different worlds [Chalmers, by Sider]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
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13962
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Two-dimensional semantics gives a 'primary' and 'secondary' proposition for each statement [Chalmers]
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19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
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13960
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In two-dimensional semantics we have two aspects to truth in virtue of meaning [Chalmers]
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