Combining Philosophers
Ideas for David J.Chalmers, Richard P. Feynman and George Berkeley
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11 ideas
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
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6716
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Language is presumably for communication, and names stand for ideas [Berkeley]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
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14708
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Rationalist 2D semantics posits necessary relations between meaning, apriority, and possibility [Chalmers, by Schroeter]
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13958
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The 'primary intension' is non-empirical, and fixes extensions based on the actual-world reference [Chalmers]
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2399
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Meaning has split into primary ("watery stuff"), and secondary counterfactual meaning ("H2O") [Chalmers]
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13959
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The 'secondary intension' is determined by rigidifying (as H2O) the 'water' picked out in the actual world [Chalmers]
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13957
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Primary and secondary intensions are the a priori (actual) and a posteriori (counterfactual) aspects of meaning [Chalmers]
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13961
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We have 'primary' truth-conditions for the actual world, and derived 'secondary' ones for counterfactual worlds [Chalmers]
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14739
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'Water' is two-dimensionally inconstant, with different intensions in different worlds [Chalmers, by Sider]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
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13962
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Two-dimensional semantics gives a 'primary' and 'secondary' proposition for each statement [Chalmers]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
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6718
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I can't really go wrong if I stick to wordless thought [Berkeley]
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19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
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13960
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In two-dimensional semantics we have two aspects to truth in virtue of meaning [Chalmers]
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