Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Dennis Whitcomb, Joseph Melia and Laura Schroeter
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13 ideas
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
14720
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Semantic theory assigns meanings to expressions, and metasemantics explains how this works [Schroeter]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
14695
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Semantic theories show how truth of sentences depends on rules for interpreting and joining their parts [Schroeter]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
14696
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Simple semantics assigns extensions to names and to predicates [Schroeter]
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14697
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'Federer' and 'best tennis player' can't mean the same, despite having the same extension [Schroeter]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
14698
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Possible worlds semantics uses 'intensions' - functions which assign extensions at each world [Schroeter]
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14699
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Possible worlds make 'I' and that person's name synonymous, but they have different meanings [Schroeter]
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14709
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Possible worlds semantics implies a constitutive connection between meanings and modal claims [Schroeter]
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14719
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In the possible worlds account all necessary truths are same (because they all map to the True) [Schroeter]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
14701
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Array worlds along the horizontal, and contexts (world,person,time) along the vertical [Schroeter]
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14702
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If we introduce 'actually' into modal talk, we need possible worlds twice to express this [Schroeter]
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14705
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Do we know apriori how we refer to names and natural kinds, but their modal profiles only a posteriori? [Schroeter]
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14715
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2D fans defend it for conceptual analysis, for meaning, and for internalist reference [Schroeter]
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14716
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2D semantics can't respond to contingent apriori claims, since there is no single proposition involved [Schroeter]
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