Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Donald Davidson, Edmund Husserl and Diogenes Laertius
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14 ideas
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
6387
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A minimum requirement for a theory of meaning is that it include an account of truth [Davidson]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
19149
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If we reject corresponding 'facts', we should also give up the linked idea of 'representations' [Davidson]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
19163
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You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it [Davidson]
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15160
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Davidson rejected ordinary meaning, and just used truth and reference instead [Davidson, by Soames]
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14612
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Davidson aimed to show that language is structured by first-order logic [Davidson, by Smart]
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4041
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Sentences held true determine the meanings of the words they contain [Davidson]
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6391
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A theory of truth tells us how communication by language is possible [Davidson]
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23289
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Knowing the potential truth conditions of a sentence is necessary and sufficient for understanding [Davidson]
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19152
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Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker [Davidson]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
19162
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Meaning involves use, but a sentence has many uses, while meaning stays fixed [Davidson]
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6395
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An understood sentence can be used for almost anything; it isn't language if it has only one use [Davidson]
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23290
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It could be that the use of a sentence is explained by its truth conditions [Davidson]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
19131
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We recognise sentences at once as linguistic units; we then figure out their parts [Davidson]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
6394
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The pattern of sentences held true gives sentences their meaning [Davidson]
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