Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Donald Davidson, Edmund Husserl and Friedrich Schlegel
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39 ideas
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
6387
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A minimum requirement for a theory of meaning is that it include an account of truth [Davidson]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
19149
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If we reject corresponding 'facts', we should also give up the linked idea of 'representations' [Davidson]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
19163
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You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it [Davidson]
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15160
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Davidson rejected ordinary meaning, and just used truth and reference instead [Davidson, by Soames]
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14612
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Davidson aimed to show that language is structured by first-order logic [Davidson, by Smart]
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4041
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Sentences held true determine the meanings of the words they contain [Davidson]
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6391
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A theory of truth tells us how communication by language is possible [Davidson]
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23289
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Knowing the potential truth conditions of a sentence is necessary and sufficient for understanding [Davidson]
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19152
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Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker [Davidson]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
19162
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Meaning involves use, but a sentence has many uses, while meaning stays fixed [Davidson]
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6395
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An understood sentence can be used for almost anything; it isn't language if it has only one use [Davidson]
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23290
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It could be that the use of a sentence is explained by its truth conditions [Davidson]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
19131
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We recognise sentences at once as linguistic units; we then figure out their parts [Davidson]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
6394
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The pattern of sentences held true gives sentences their meaning [Davidson]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
6388
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Is reference the key place where language and the world meet? [Davidson]
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6390
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With a holistic approach, we can give up reference in empirical theories of language [Davidson]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
6389
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To explain the reference of a name, you must explain its sentence-role, so reference can't be defined nonlinguistically [Davidson]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
19156
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Modern predicates have 'places', and are sentences with singular terms deleted from the places [Davidson]
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19176
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The concept of truth can explain predication [Davidson]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
7772
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Compositionality explains how long sentences work, and truth conditions are the main compositional feature [Davidson, by Lycan]
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19133
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If you assign semantics to sentence parts, the sentence fails to compose a whole [Davidson]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
7327
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Davidson thinks Frege lacks an account of how words create sentence-meaning [Davidson, by Miller,A]
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7331
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A theory of meaning comes down to translating sentences into Fregean symbolic logic [Davidson, by Macey]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
19132
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Top-down semantic analysis must begin with truth, as it is obvious, and explains linguistic usage [Davidson]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
7769
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You can state truth-conditions for "I am sick now" by relativising it to a speaker at a time [Davidson, by Lycan]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
19158
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'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about humanity, so it's a different proposition from 'Socrates is human' [Davidson]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
3968
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Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them [Davidson]
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19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
3970
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Thought is only fully developed if we communicate with others [Davidson]
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8870
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Content of thought is established through communication, so knowledge needs other minds [Davidson]
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19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
6179
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Should we assume translation to define truth, or the other way around? [Blackburn on Davidson]
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6399
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Criteria of translation give us the identity of conceptual schemes [Davidson]
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19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
18703
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Davidson's Cogito: 'I think, therefore I am generally right' [Davidson, by Button]
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8869
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The principle of charity attributes largely consistent logic and largely true beliefs to speakers [Davidson]
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3971
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There is simply no alternative to the 'principle of charity' in interpreting what others do [Davidson]
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19154
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The principle of charity says an interpreter must assume the logical constants [Davidson]
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19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / d. Metaphor
7775
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Understanding a metaphor is a creative act, with no rules [Davidson]
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19161
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We indicate use of a metaphor by its obvious falseness, or trivial truth [Davidson]
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7776
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Metaphors just mean what their words literally mean [Davidson]
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7777
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We accept a metaphor when we see the sentence is false [Davidson]
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