display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
82 ideas
6387 | A minimum requirement for a theory of meaning is that it include an account of truth [Davidson] |
9167 | Frege felt that meanings must be public, so they are abstractions rather than mental entities [Frege, by Putnam] |
9583 | Psychological logicians are concerned with sense of words, but mathematicians study the reference [Frege] |
9584 | Identity baffles psychologists, since A and B must be presented differently to identify them [Frege] |
19149 | If we reject corresponding 'facts', we should also give up the linked idea of 'representations' [Davidson] |
22318 | Frege failed to show when two sets of truth-conditions are equivalent [Frege, by Potter] |
7307 | A thought is not psychological, but a condition of the world that makes a sentence true [Frege, by Miller,A] |
4980 | The meaning (reference) of a sentence is its truth value - the circumstance of it being true or false [Frege] |
19163 | You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it [Davidson] |
15160 | Davidson rejected ordinary meaning, and just used truth and reference instead [Davidson, by Soames] |
14612 | Davidson aimed to show that language is structured by first-order logic [Davidson, by Smart] |
4041 | Sentences held true determine the meanings of the words they contain [Davidson] |
6391 | A theory of truth tells us how communication by language is possible [Davidson] |
23289 | Knowing the potential truth conditions of a sentence is necessary and sufficient for understanding [Davidson] |
19152 | Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker [Davidson] |
19162 | Meaning involves use, but a sentence has many uses, while meaning stays fixed [Davidson] |
6395 | An understood sentence can be used for almost anything; it isn't language if it has only one use [Davidson] |
23290 | It could be that the use of a sentence is explained by its truth conditions [Davidson] |
16879 | A sign won't gain sense just from being used in sentences with familiar components [Frege] |
8646 | Words in isolation seem to have ideas as meanings, but words have meaning in propositions [Frege] |
7732 | Never ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a proposition [Frege] |
8446 | We understand new propositions by constructing their sense from the words [Frege] |
19131 | We recognise sentences at once as linguistic units; we then figure out their parts [Davidson] |
9180 | Holism says all language use is also a change in the rules of language [Frege, by Dummett] |
6394 | The pattern of sentences held true gives sentences their meaning [Davidson] |
4981 | The reference of a word should be understood as part of the reference of the sentence [Frege] |
6388 | Is reference the key place where language and the world meet? [Davidson] |
6390 | With a holistic approach, we can give up reference in empirical theories of language [Davidson] |
15597 | Frege's Puzzle: from different semantics we infer different reference for two names with the same reference [Frege, by Fine,K] |
17002 | Frege's 'sense' is ambiguous, between the meaning of a designator, and how it fixes reference [Kripke on Frege] |
18778 | Every descriptive name has a sense, but may not have a reference [Frege] |
7805 | Frege started as anti-realist, but the sense/reference distinction led him to realism [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
4976 | The meaning (reference) of 'evening star' is the same as that of 'morning star', but not the sense [Frege] |
4977 | In maths, there are phrases with a clear sense, but no actual reference [Frege] |
4979 | We are driven from sense to reference by our desire for truth [Frege] |
8449 | Senses can't be subjective, because propositions would be private, and disagreement impossible [Frege] |
15155 | Expressions always give ways of thinking of referents, rather than the referents themselves [Frege, by Soames] |
6389 | To explain the reference of a name, you must explain its sentence-role, so reference can't be defined nonlinguistically [Davidson] |
4972 | I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege] |
19156 | Modern predicates have 'places', and are sentences with singular terms deleted from the places [Davidson] |
19176 | The concept of truth can explain predication [Davidson] |
22280 | Frege's account was top-down and decompositional, not bottom-up and compositional [Frege, by Potter] |
7772 | Compositionality explains how long sentences work, and truth conditions are the main compositional feature [Davidson, by Lycan] |
19133 | If you assign semantics to sentence parts, the sentence fails to compose a whole [Davidson] |
7309 | Frege's 'sense' is the strict and literal meaning, stripped of tone [Frege, by Miller,A] |
7312 | 'Sense' solves the problems of bearerless names, substitution in beliefs, and informativeness [Frege, by Miller,A] |
11126 | 'Sense' gives meaning to non-referring names, and to two expressions for one referent [Frege, by Margolis/Laurence] |
8164 | Frege was the first to construct a plausible theory of meaning [Frege, by Dummett] |
9817 | Earlier Frege focuses on content itself; later he became interested in understanding content [Frege, by Dummett] |
8171 | Frege divided the meaning of a sentence into sense, force and tone [Frege, by Dummett] |
4954 | Frege uses 'sense' to mean both a designator's meaning, and the way its reference is determined [Kripke on Frege] |
7304 | Frege explained meaning as sense, semantic value, reference, force and tone [Frege, by Miller,A] |
7327 | Davidson thinks Frege lacks an account of how words create sentence-meaning [Davidson, by Miller,A] |
7331 | A theory of meaning comes down to translating sentences into Fregean symbolic logic [Davidson, by Macey] |
19132 | Top-down semantic analysis must begin with truth, as it is obvious, and explains linguistic usage [Davidson] |
7769 | You can state truth-conditions for "I am sick now" by relativising it to a speaker at a time [Davidson, by Lycan] |
19158 | 'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about humanity, so it's a different proposition from 'Socrates is human' [Davidson] |
4974 | For all the multiplicity of languages, mankind has a common stock of thoughts [Frege] |
16873 | Thoughts are not subjective or psychological, because some thoughts are the same for us all [Frege] |
16872 | A thought is the sense expressed by a sentence, and is what we prove [Frege] |
19467 | A 'thought' is something for which the question of truth can arise; thoughts are senses of sentences [Frege] |
16874 | The parts of a thought map onto the parts of a sentence [Frege] |
19472 | A sentence is only a thought if it is complete, and has a time-specification [Frege] |
3968 | Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them [Davidson] |
9370 | A statement is analytic if substitution of synonyms can make it a logical truth [Frege, by Boghossian] |
8743 | Frege considered analyticity to be an epistemic concept [Frege, by Shapiro] |
7725 | 'P or not-p' seems to be analytic, but does not fit Kant's account, lacking clear subject or predicate [Frege, by Weiner] |
20295 | All analytic truths can become logical truths, by substituting definitions or synonyms [Frege, by Rey] |
7316 | Analytic truths are those that can be demonstrated using only logic and definitions [Frege, by Miller,A] |
2515 | Frege fails to give a concept of analyticity, so he fails to explain synthetic a priori truth that way [Katz on Frege] |
8870 | Content of thought is established through communication, so knowledge needs other minds [Davidson] |
3970 | Thought is only fully developed if we communicate with others [Davidson] |
6179 | Should we assume translation to define truth, or the other way around? [Blackburn on Davidson] |
6399 | Criteria of translation give us the identity of conceptual schemes [Davidson] |
8869 | The principle of charity attributes largely consistent logic and largely true beliefs to speakers [Davidson] |
3971 | There is simply no alternative to the 'principle of charity' in interpreting what others do [Davidson] |
19154 | The principle of charity says an interpreter must assume the logical constants [Davidson] |
18703 | Davidson's Cogito: 'I think, therefore I am generally right' [Davidson, by Button] |
7777 | We accept a metaphor when we see the sentence is false [Davidson] |
7776 | Metaphors just mean what their words literally mean [Davidson] |
7775 | Understanding a metaphor is a creative act, with no rules [Davidson] |
19161 | We indicate use of a metaphor by its obvious falseness, or trivial truth [Davidson] |